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We provide theoretical foundations for several common (nested) representations
of intrinsic linear habit formation. These representations are dynamically consistent
and additive, with geometrically decaying coe±cients of habit formation. Our
axiomatization introduces a revealed preference theory of weaning a decision-maker
from her habits using the device of compensation. We characterize linear habit
formation in terms of the ability to wean using uniquely determined compensating
streams. Moreover, we distinguish between habits that are responsive to weaning
and those that are persistent, develop a simple choice-theoretic measure of the rate of
habit decay, and demonstrate how to recover the entire sequence of habit formation
coe±cients from observed choice behavior. We introduce novel monotonicity and
separability axioms that are appropriate for time-nonseparable preferences. Our
analysis suggests techniques for eliciting dynamic reference points from choice
behavior and obtaining discounted utility representations on endogenously generated
auxiliary spaces.
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Is an individual's valuation for a good a®ected by its frequency of consumption? Will
someone who is accustomed to certain levels of comfort and quality come to expect and
demand the same? And is an increase in consumption always preferable, even if the increase
is only temporary?
The common thread binding these questions is that not one can be properly addressed in
the standard intertemporally separable model of choice. Consequently, the literature in such
varied ¯elds as macroeconomics, ¯nance, and labor economics has seen a surge in models
incorporating intertemporal nonseparability through habit formation. By presuming a
correlation between an individual's prior consumption levels (her intrinsic habit) and her
felicity from present and future consumption, such models have had success in accounting
for notable phenomena that more traditional theory has been unable to explain.1
The literature on habit formation has, however, faced at least two di±culties. First,
it has been unable to come to a consensus on a single model of habits, and in some cases
the predictions of the most commonly utilized models disagree (Wendner (2003)).2 Second,
since a more °exible preference improves the ability to explain data, models of habit forma-
tion - along with other models employing exotic preferences - are vulnerable to the critique
that they are \an excuse for free parameters" (Backus, Routledge & Zin (2004)). Related to
these two critiques is the scarcity of theoretical work examining the underpinnings of habit
forming preferences. By clarifying the implications for choice behavior, such work would
help illuminate why one utility representation of habit formation might be more inherently
reasonable than another; or why the commonly used incarnations of habit formation are
reasonable at all. We contribute to the literature in that theoretical vein.
1Variations of the model of intrinsic linear habit formation we axiomatize have shed light on data
indicating individuals are far more averse to risk than expected (e.g., Constantinides (1990) on the equity
premium); suggested why consumption growth is connected strongly to income, but only weakly to interest
rates (see Boldrin, Christiano & Fisher (2001) for a real business cycles model with habit formation
and intersectoral in°exibilities); and explained the consumption contractions seen before exchange rate
stabilization programs collapse (Uribe (2002)).
2While intrinsic linear habit formation is the most commonly used model, some models posit habits that
are nonlinear, extrinsic (the \catching up with the Joneses" e®ect of Abel (1990)), or enter the discount
factor (Shi & Epstein (1993)). Chen & Ludvigson (2004) use formal estimation to argue that habits are
intrinsic and nonlinear. One common nonlinear model speci¯es a linear habit aggregator that divides
consumption in the felicity (Carroll, Overland & Weil (2000)); Wendner (2003) criticized this model for its
counterintuitive implications for consumption growth.
11.1 Intrinsic linear habits
In this paper we formulate a theory of history dependent intertemporal choice using the
device of compensating a decision-maker (DM) for giving up her habits. In particular, we
provide a revealed preference theory of weaning a DM from her habits using compensating
streams that are analogous to drug cessation aids such as the nicotine patch. Our represen-
tative DM is described by a family of continuous preference relations that govern her choice
behavior at every history. She is dynamically consistent given her consumption history, can
be weaned from her habits using weakly decreasing streams of compensation, and satis-
¯es novel separability and monotonicity axioms that are appropriate for time-nonseparable
preferences. Though our DM is fully rational, her history dependent behavior violates the
axioms of Koopmans (1960), upon which the standard theory of discounted utility rests.
Instead, our compensation-based theory lays the foundation for the model of linear habit
formation, in which a DM evaluates consumption at each point in time with respect to a
reference point that is generated linearly from her consumption history. We denote the set
of possible in¯nite consumption streams of some good by C and the set of possible in¯nite
consumption histories of that good by H.3 A consumption stream c 2 C is written as
c = (c0;c1;c2 :::), with ct denoting the prescribed consumption level t periods from today;
while a history h 2 H is written as h = (:::;h3;h2;h1), with hk denoting the consumption
level k periods ago. We refer to a consumption history as a habit. For the case of scalar
consumption, the model of linear habit formation speci¯es that for each habit h 2 H the
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The felicity u : R ! R is continuous and is often assumed to be monotonic. The habit
aggregator ' : H ! R is a strictly increasing linear functional with geometrically decaying
habit formation coe±cients f¸kgk¸1 that sum to no more than one. That is, for each h 2 H,
'(h) =
P1
k=1 ¸khk, where each ¸k 2 (0;1) and
¸k+1
¸k · 1 ¡ ¸1. If the DM initially has the
habit h 2 H and chooses to consume the stream c 2 C, then after t periods her habit will
be (h;c0;c1;:::;ct¡1). The value '(h;c0;c1;:::;ct¡1) serves as the reference point against
3The history and consumption spaces are formalized in Section 2.
2which the DM evaluates her period-t consumption level ct, and is often referred to as the
habit stock.
A number of variations of this model are prevalent in the literature. We provide foun-
dations for this general formulation, which has an in¯nite sequence of habit formation
coe±cients, as well as for some common tractable variants that impose special restrictions
on the f¸kgk¸1. Our approach also generalizes to a multidimensional version that can ac-
commodate multiple habit-forming and non-habit forming goods. While our main theorem
axiomatizes the case in which the felicity u(¢) is monotonic, as is often assumed in applied
work, a corollary relaxes the monotonicity assumption to allow for the possibility that the
habit-forming good is harmful. The theorems we present are explicitly stated for the case
of in¯nite histories, but readily accommodate bounded histories as well as histories that are
¯nite but grow unboundedly.4 Moreover, the representation may be easily generalized to
one of risky choice over consumption streams, in which the DM cares about the correlation
in lotteries. The results we provide shed light on the de¯ning characteristics of linear habit
formation, clarify the di®erences among nested speci¯cations of the model, and provide
various measures of habit-forming tendencies.
1.2 Compensating the DM to induce habit-free behavior
Our main axiom of choice behavior, Habit Compensation (HC), attempts to capture the
essence of linear habit formation. This axiom clari¯es how the DM's indi®erence curves
change for di®erent habits and provides a means to elicit her endogenously changing refer-
ence points from choice behavior. The axiom is composed of three parts, of which the ¯rst
two play central roles.
Axiom HC(i), Weaning, o®ers a revealed-preference de¯nition of weaning that builds on
the notion underlying such drug cessation aids as the nicotine patch. The nicotine patch
weans a smoker from her habit by providing a fading stream of nicotine that satis¯es her
cravings. When wearing the patch, the smoker behaves as if she were a nonsmoker. We
allow for \patches" that help a DM with a habit h behave as if she had a lower habit
h0.5 That is, the patch may reduce her habit but not necessarily eliminate it. A DM is
4Models with ¯nite but unboundedly growing consumption histories may be seen as applications of our
in¯nite history representation with a constant initial habit (:::;q;q).
5By this we mean h ¸ h0, i.e. hk ¸ h0
k for every k, with at least one strict inequality.
3weaned from her habit h to a lower habit h0 if, when endowed with some appropriate weakly
decreasing stream of consumption dh0;h at habit h, her choice behavior at habit h is the
same as her behavior at habit h0. We call the stream of consumption dh0;h a compensating
stream.
Axiom HC(i) asserts that the DM can be weaned in this manner. More formally, the
axiom asserts the existence and uniqueness of a compensating stream dh0;h for each pair of
habits h ¸ h0. Our representation theorem shows that the restriction that the compensating
streams are unique corresponds to a mild condition on the DM's felicity that is nearly
always satis¯ed. Moreover, our results show that the compensating streams are determined
independently of the DM's felicity and discount factor. Therefore, Axiom HC(i) describes
a choice behavior that isolates the e®ect of the habit formation coe±cients. In fact, we
suggest a choice experiment from which the DM's entire sequence of habit coe±cients can
be recovered without regard to her exact felicity, discount factor, or consumption history,
thereby o®ering a response to the \free parameters" critique of the model of linear habit
formation.
Axiom HC(ii), Compensated Separability, ensures that with appropriate compensation,
the choice between two streams is independent of future considerations, as long as the
continuation path is the same in both. To illustrate, imagine that today is Saturday and
that our DM is a smoker planning to reduce her cigarette consumption as soon as the
weekend is over. Suppose that she will receive a nicotine patch on Monday, which she
plans to use to cut down to x cigarettes a day.6 In the meanwhile, she has one pack of
cigarettes languishing in her pocket and must decide what to do with it. One option is to
smoke the entire pack today and abstain tomorrow; another is to smoke half the pack today
and half tomorrow. How should she compare these two options? If the smoker is assured
of receiving the appropriate patch in each case on Monday, then Axiom HC(ii) implies that
her choice is independent of x (i.e., she can focus on this weekend's consumption when
deciding).
This axiom is trivially satis¯ed by the standard model of discounted utility a la Koop-
mans (1960), since a DM with time-separable preferences does not require any compensa-
6Without complicating this story using our multidimensional model of habits, we cannot explain the
smoker's reasons for cutting down. This exercise simply asks her to compare streams in which she smokes
various amounts over the weekend and then cuts down using a patch.
4tion: the \compensating streams" in that model would be identically zero. Axiom HC(ii)
may be seen as an appropriate generalization of separability for time-nonseparable prefer-
ences. However, it is not a typical separability condition because our task is quite di®erent
than that of Koopmans, whose representative DM satis¯es time-separability on the actual
consumption space. In contrast, our DM satis¯es time-separablity only on an endogenously
generated auxiliary space composed of streams of the form (c0 ¡ '(h);c1 ¡ '(h;c0);c2 ¡
'(h;c0;c1);:::).7 The techniques we develop suggest a means to elicit subjective refer-
ence points from choice behavior and derive discounted utility representations on spaces
endogenously de¯ned by these reference points.
1.3 A new monotonicity axiom
Most theories of choice assume monotonic preferences, in which the DM is better o® when-
ever consumption in any period is increased. We claim this is too strong an assumption if
the DM's preferences are time-nonseparable. For example, suppose a content individual of
modest means is brie°y permitted to live luxuriously, but must then return to her humble
lifestyle. Would her welfare be increased, or might the experience of luxury render the
return to her former circumstances unbearable? The answer may depend on the individual
in question. We propose a weakened monotonicity axiom, Gains Monotonicity (GM), that
accommodates either possibility.
Since increasing only a ¯nite number of elements in a consumption stream may reduce
future enjoyment of that stream, we refer to a \gain" as a uniform increase in every period's
consumption from some point forward. Our Axiom GM says that the individual's welfare is
unambiguously increased if she is permitted to keep her newfound increase in consumption
inde¯nitely. We prove that Axiom GM ensures that the felicity in the model of linear habit
formation is monotonic, and argue that it is consistent with experiments indicating that
individuals favor increasing streams.8
Gains Monotonicity is relevant to cases in which the consumption good is a desirable
one, as is typically assumed in the applied literature on habit formation. We suggest
7Axiom HC(ii) has the °avor of a separability axiom but does not translate directly to a separability
condition on the auxiliary space. We prove using HC(i) and the surjectivity of a certain mapping that
HC(ii) implies the separability conditions of Gorman (1968) on the auxiliary space.
8Refer to Camerer& Loewenstein (2004) for a comprehensive survey of such results.
5a weakening of this axiom, Gains Sensitivity (GS), that is applicable when the good in
question can be harmful when consumed excessively relative to past consumption (e.g, as
in the case of alcohol) or in our model of multidimensional habit formation (due to potential
contemporaneous inseparabilities). Replacing Gains Monotonicity with Gains Sensitivity
relaxes the monotonicity requirements on the DM's felicity but leaves our representation
theorems otherwise unchanged.
1.4 Overview of results
Section 4 o®ers our main representation theorem, which characterizes linear habit formation
in terms of the ability to wean a DM using uniquely determined compensating streams. The
result implies that the habit formation coe±cients and compensating streams are unique
for nearly all applications of linear habit formation. In fact, Section 5 demonstrates how
to recover the DM's entire sequence of habit formation coe±cients directly from observed
choice behavior, without regard to her felicity, discount factor, or consumption history.
We introduce various measures of habit formation. Section 6 considers the DM's rate of
habit decay in a common version of the model where the habit aggregator satis¯es an au-
toregressive law of motion. There we provide an additional axiom, Immediate Equilibration
(IE), that describes a simple choice experiment which simultaneously generates the autore-
gressive structure and calibrates the DM's habit decay parameter in that model. Section
7 distinguishes between models of linear habit formation in which habits are responsive to
weaning and those in which habits are persistent. Responsive habits are those from which
the DM may be weaned e±ciently, using a ¯nite amount of compensation; in contrast, per-
sistent habits require a constant level of compensation (e.g., some heroin addicts require a
steady dose of methadone for the rest of their lives). We show that the distinction between
these two types of habits corresponds to a simple di®erence in modeling that can markedly
a®ect choice behavior.
We also consider several generalizations of our results. Section 8 extends our theory to
a multidimensional model of habit formation, in which the DM forms independent linear
habits over a subset of the commodity space. Such a model can be used to understand
multiple addictions and addiction cycles. Section 9 extends our representation to risky
consumption streams and argues that by reinterpreting the commodity space, our axioma-
6tization also provides foundations for a model of habits in which the DM forms habits over
rates of consumption growth (i.e., the argument of the felicity is log-linear).
1.5 Connections to the literature
This paper is related to a growing theoretical literature on intrinsic and dynamically consis-
tent habit formation, beginning with the seminal papers by Iannaccone (1986) and Becker
& Murphy (1988) on rational addiction. These papers o®ered the ¯rst models in which
individuals might rationally choose to experiment with addictive substances, even though
they know this may lead them on a path to addiction.
Rustichini & Siconol¯ (2005) also o®er an axiomatization of dynamically consistent
habit formation over consumption streams. Unlike this paper, they axiomatize a model of
(recursive) habit formation that does not o®er a particular structure for the utility or form
of habit aggregation; and in general, their axioms have a very di®erent °avor from our own.
Other work on dynamically consistent habit formation includes Gul & Pesendorfer (2007),
who consider preferences over opportunity sets of streams of consumption, rather than
over the streams themselves; their decision-makers have di±culties with self-control and
may prefer to restrict their options. Other approaches to habit formation include decision-
makers who are myopic (Pollak (1970)), discount rates that depend on prior consumption
(Shi & Epstein (1993)), and habits that are extrinsic (e.g., Abel (1990) and Campbell &
Cochrane (1999)).
The type of preference in which we are interested falls under the rubric of intrinsic
reference dependence. A well-known member of this class of preferences is loss aversion,
discussed in Tversky & Kahneman (1991) in the context of riskless choice. The salient
feature of loss aversion is that the disutility from losses is more acute than utility from
gains. While the classical representation of loss aversion is not dynamically consistent,
our representation can easily accommodate a dynamically consistent version in which the
felicity takes the well-known \S"-shaped form.
A dynamically inconsistent foundation for a special case of loss aversion is o®ered by
Shalev (1997).9 Another model incorporating loss aversion is suggested by Loewenstein &
Prelec (1992); that model combines hyperbolic discounting with a specially curved utility
9Shalev's model is not dynamically consistent because it is based on the model of Gilboa (1989), which
relaxes Savage's sure-thing principle.
7function over gains and losses. Both models attempt to account for experimentally observed
departures from discounted utility. These anomalies of intertemporal choice, summarized
in the survey of Camerer & Loewenstein (2004), include evidence suggesting that di®erent
discount rates are applied to gains and losses; that the discount rate for losses appears lower
than that for gains; and that individuals get more disutility from postponing consumption
than they get utility from speeding it up. However, the time-nonseparable representation
which we axiomatize can also account for such phenomena; as Camerer and Loewenstein
note, \these e®ects are consistent with stable, uniform, time discounting once one measures
discount rates with a more realistic utility function."
Finally, our analysis contributes to the choice-theoretic literature on reference depen-
dence, particularly to the static model of Neilson (2006). That paper o®ers axiomatic
foundations for a model in which the DM chooses a bundle, the ¯rst component of which
serves as the reference point against which the other components are evaluated. Neil-
son approaches the problem by using an axiom that identi¯es the ¯rst component of the
bundle as the reference point. By contrast, our approach does not assume a particular
reference point but derives an in¯nite sequence of endogenously changing reference points
that are weighted averages of historical consumption. Our reference points are extracted
using a sequence of functional equations generated from the dynamics of the problem. Our
method allows us to link an entire family of history dependent preferences in a dynamically
consistent manner.
2 The framework
We consider a sophisticated DM who has preferences over streams of consumption. For-
mally, suppose that the DM faces an in¯nite-horizon decision problem in which a single
habit forming good is consumed in every period t 2 N = f0;1;2;:::g from the same set
Q = R+.10 The choice q 2 Q may be interpreted as a choice of either quantity or quality
of the consumption good, with higher q corresponding to a higher level. We will use q 2 Q
to refer to a generic one-period consumption level.
The DM's preferences are stationary (i.e., they do not depend on calendar time). How-
ever, they do depend on her consumption history, her habit. The set of possible habits is
10To streamline the presentation we leave the extension Q = Rn
+ (n ¸ 1) to Section 8.
8time-invariant and given by the space of bounded streams




hk < 1 g:
Each habit h 2 H is an in¯nite stream denoting prior consumption and is written as
h = (:::;h3;h2;h1), where hk denotes the consumption level of the DM k periods ago. We
endow the space H with the sup metric ½H(h;h0) = supk jhk ¡ h0
kj.
At any point in time, the DM's preferences under habit h 2 H are given by ºh and are
de¯ned on the set of bounded consumption streams




ct < 1 g:
A choice c = (c0;c1;c2;:::) 2 C is an in¯nite consumption stream; ct is the consumption
level prescribed for t periods after the date at which the DM makes her choice, which is
interpreted as the current date. We consider C as a metric subspace of £1
t=0Q endowed









t=0Q endowed with ½C is a
topologically separable metric space, so is C when viewed as a metric subspace.11
The DM is cognizant that her future tastes will be in°uenced by her consumption
history. Starting from any initial habit h 2 H, consuming the stream c 2 C results in
the date-t habit (h;c0;c1;:::;ct¡1). Therefore, DM's preferences may undergo an in¯nite
succession of changes endogenously induced from her choice of consumption stream. Each
resulting preference is a member of the family º= fºhgh2H.
Our setup explicitly presumes histories are in¯nite because this assumption is commonly
invoked in the literature. Alternatively, one could assume that the DM's preferences are
a®ected only by her last K ¸ 3 consumption levels.12 The notation in our analysis would
remain the same so long as current and future habits are truncated after K components;
that is, (h;c0) would denote the habit (hK¡1;:::;h2;h1;c0).
11Ensuring that C is separable in this manner allows us to concentrate on the structural elements of habit
formation. Alternatively we could impose separability directly as in Rustichini & Siconol¯ (2005). Ble-
ichrodt, Rohde & Wakker (2007) is representative of a literature that concentrates on relaxing assumptions
about the consumption space, including separability.
12K ¸ 3 is required only for the proof of time-additivity.
92.1 Useful notation
Here we collect some notation that will be used throughout the paper. We reserve the
variable k 2 N = f1;2;3;:::g to signify a period of previous consumption and the variable
t 2 f0;1;2;:::g to signify a period of impending consumption. When the stream c is
consumed under habit h, the resulting date-t habit (h;c0;c1;:::;ct¡1) is denoted by h(t) as
long as this is unambiguous. At times it will be convenient to let hq denote the habit (h;q)
which forms after consuming q under habit h. The notation c + c0 or h + h0 refers to usual
vector addition. As is customary, tc denotes (ct;ct+1;ct+2;:::) and ct denotes (c0;c1;:::;ct).
If c0 2 C we write (ct; t+1c+c0) to denote (c0;c1;:::;ct;ct+1+c0
0;ct+2+c0
1;:::). For ® 2 R we
use the similar notation ®t to signify the t-period repetition (®;®;:::;®) and (ct; t+1c+®)
to compactly denote (c0;c1;:::;ct;ct+1+®;ct+2+®;:::) whenever the resulting stream is in
C. The zero habit (:::;0;0) will typically be denoted by ~ 0. Finally, by convention h ¸ h0
(or c ¸ c0) means hk ¸ h0
k for all k (or ct ¸ c0
t for all t), with at least one strict inequality.
3 The main axioms
This section presents axioms of choice behavior that are necessary and su±cient for repre-















where ± 2 (0;1); each ¸k 2 (0;1) and
¸k+1
¸k · 1¡¸1 for k ¸ 1; and u : R ! R is continuous
and monotonic.13 The following axioms are imposed for all h 2 H.
3.1 Rational choice
The ¯rst three axioms are familiar in the theory of rational choice over consumption streams.
First, the DM's choices are derived from a preference relation.
Axiom PR (Preference Relation) ºh is a complete and transitive binary relation.
The DM's preferences are also required to be continuous. As usual, Âh denotes the
asymmetric part of ºh.
13See Theorem 4.1 for a precise description of the monotonicity and \acyclicity" of u(¢).
10Axiom C (Continuity) For all c 2 C, fc0 : c0 Âh cg and fc0 : c Âh c0g are open.
These axioms ensure a continuous utility representation on our separable space.
Proposition 3.1. There exists a continuous utility representation of ºh.
We further assume that the DM's preferences are dynamically consistent in a history
dependent manner, in the sense that given the relevant histories, she will not change her
mind tomorrow about the consumption stream she chooses today.
Axiom DC (Dynamic Consistency) For any q 2 Q and c;c0 2 C, (q;c) ºh (q;c0) if and
only if c ºhq c0.
Dynamic consistency helps ensure that dynamic programming techniques can be used to
solve the DM's choice problem, and that the DM's welfare can be analyzed unambiguously.
If dynamic consistency is violated it becomes more di±cult to interpret the DM's choices
for the future (her future self may wish to change plans midstream) as well as discuss
the welfare implications of her choices (the welfare of her present self may come at the
expense of future selves, and vice versa). Without dynamic consistency, the DM's choice
must be modeled through an equilibrium concept rather than as a decision problem.14
Moreover, as noted in Section 1.5, the axiom is able to accommodate a number of observed
time-discounting anomalies.
3.2 A weakening of monotonicity
Individuals are often assumed to have monotonic preferences over consumption streams;
that is, the DM is assumed to be better o® whenever consumption in any period is increased.
This seemingly innocuous assumption comes into question when the DM's preferences are
time-nonseparable. When consuming a stream c, one may imagine that the DM experiences
a feeling of gain in a particular period t if ct ¡ ct¡1 > 0, or more generally, if period-t
consumption is larger than some composite of prior consumption levels. However, if only
a ¯nite number of elements in a consumption stream are increased then the DM may face
disappointment (or at least a reduction in enjoyment) when the increase ends. The short-
14This is the multi-selves approach of Strotz (1955). A related equilibrium notion is studied in KÄ oszegi
& Rabin (2006b)'s model of dynamic reference dependence (which extends the static model in KÄ oszegi &
Rabin (2006a)). There, the utility over sequences of consumption and beliefs is technically consistent but
beliefs are forced to be determined rationally in a personal equilibrium.
11term bene¯t from the temporary consumption increase might not su±ce to overcome the
long-term loss.
Therefore, this paper refers to a \gain" more speci¯cally as a uniform increase in all
consumption from some point forward. For any ® 2 R and t, we refer to a stream (ct; t+1c+
®) as a gain over c when ® > 0 and a loss relative to c when ® < 0. Formally, we impose
the following weakened monotonicity axiom.
Axiom GM (Gains Monotonicity) If c 2 C and ® > 0, then c + ® Âh c.
GM says that the DM is happy with an increase in her future consumption so long as
the increase is applied to every period; that is, raising q will raise her utility so long as it
doesn't a®ect future gains and losses in consumption across successive periods. It is easy
to see that if the preference relation satis¯es GM and DC, then it satis¯es the following
strengthened version of Gains Monotonicity, which corresponds exactly to the notion of a
gain as we have de¯ned it.
Axiom GM* If c;c0 2 C and c = (c0t; t+1c0 + ®) for some t and ® > 0, then c Âh c0.
To provide an alternate characterization, consider the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 3.2. Let c;c0 2 C be two consumption streams with c ¸ c0.We say that c >GD c0,
or c gains-dominates c0, if c has larger period-to-period gains and smaller period-to-period
losses: that is, ct ¡ ct¡1 ¸ c0
t ¡ c0
t¡1 8 t ¸ 1.
That is, increasing the gains from any point forward in a consumption stream without
increasing the losses leads to a gains-dominating consumption stream. Observe that a
stream will gains-dominate another if and only if the di®erence between the two streams
is positive and increasing. The following proposition, proved in the Appendix, asserts
that a continuous preference relation satis¯es GM* if and only if the preference respects
gains-domination.15
Proposition 3.3 (Respect of gains-domination). A preference relation continuous in the
product topology satis¯es GM* if and only if it respects gains-domination; that is, for any
c;c0 2 C, c >GD c0 implies that c Â c0.
15As an aside, compare GM* with the weaker constant-tail monotonicity axiom of Shalev (1997), which
says (restricted to deterministic streams) that if a stream constantly gives q from time t onwards, then
raising q to some q0 > q from t onwards improves the stream. This is equivalent to the statement that
a weakly increasing (decreasing) consumption stream is at least as good (bad) as getting its worst (best)
element constantly.
12While Proposition 3.3 o®ers a natural argument for Axiom GM, there may be cases
in which the axiom lacks normative appeal. This may be because of the nature of the
good itself (e.g., an individual may feel ill from consuming alcohol excessively relative
to past consumption), or due to the presence of contemporaneous interactions between
consumption goods, such as in the multidimensional formulation we later o®er. Therefore,
we o®er the following weakening.
Axiom GS (Gains Sensitivity) There exist c 2 C and ® > 0 such that c + ® 6»h c.
Replacing Gains Monotonicity with Gains Sensitivity in our representation theorems
allows us to drop the monotonicity requirement on the DM's felicity.
3.3 Compensation
We now introduce our main structural axiom of habit formation, Habit Compensation
(HC). To present the axiom we de¯ne the set of ordered pairs of consumption histories
H = f(h0;h) 2 H £ H j h0 · hg and introduce one further piece of terminology. For any
k, we say that habits (h0;h) 2 H agree on k if hk = h0
k. Similarly, we say that the habits
(h0;h) 2 H agree on a subset of indices K ½ f1;2;:::g if they agree on each k 2 K. Axiom
HC provides a revealed preference theory of weaning a DM from her habits; formally, it
says the following.
Axiom HC (Habit Compensation) There is a collection fdh0;hg(h0;h)2H of strictly positive
streams such that
(i) (Weaning): Each dh0;h is weakly decreasing and uniquely satis¯es
c ºh0 c













t;¹ c + d
h0;hct
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(iii) (Independence of Irrelevant Habits): For any ^ k, (h0;h) 2 H that agree on ^ k, and
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then dh0;h = d
^ h0;^ h.
13For every ordered pair of histories (h0;h) 2 H, Axiom HC(i) posits the existence of
a unique compensating stream dh0;h that induces a DM with habit h to behave as if she
had habit h0. A compensating stream serves as an endowment of the habit-forming good
that is provided only at the higher habit. It is analogous to a nicotine patch that weans a
smoker from her addiction; however, we generalize the underlying notion by permitting the
smoker's habit to be either reduced or eliminated, depending on the patch used. Axiom
HC(ii) considers the e®ect of compensation applied midstream and may be viewed as a
generalization of separability for time-nonseparable preferences. According to HC(ii), if
the DM is appropriately compensated starting in period t, then her choice between two
streams depends only on the consumption levels they provide prior to t, as long as those
streams agree on their continuation path. That is, the future is \separable." Axiom HC(iii)
ensures that if (h0;h) 2 H agree on some k, then the compensation required to wean the
DM from h to h0 is independent of the period-k habit level. In other words, elements of















Figure 1: An h0-indi®erence curve over (c0;c1), ¯xing 2c, is translated under HC(i)
As illustrated in Figure 1, HC(i) establishes that the indi®erence curves for habit h0
are translated up by the strictly positive stream dh0;h into indi®erence curves for habit h.16
16There is a feature of the two indi®erence curves in Figure 1 that may not be immediately apparent
from the axiom: they correspond to the same utility, and in fact to the same felicity in every period. The
indi®erence curves that provide the DM with the same utility under each habit never cross; note that in
14The fact that dh0;h is weakly decreasing formalizes the manner in which higher habits lead
to greater \impatience" for consumption: the DM must immediately consume the highest
levels of her promised compensation in order to make the same choices that she would have
made at a lower habit. This stipulation corresponds directly to the geometric decay of the
habit formation coe±cients.
Note that the ability to wean the DM hinges critically on the linearity of habit formation.
If the argument of her felicity were nonlinear, the DM's \compensating stream" would
have to be adjusted to re°ect each consumption choice she makes. Hence the order of the
quanti¯ers in Axiom HC(i) is critical for linearity.
To clarify the role of Axiom HC(iii), let us consider a variation of linear habit formation
where it is violated.
Example 3.4. Choose a felicity u : R ! R, a discount factor ± 2 (0;1), and any strictly
positive sequence f¸kgk¸1 satisfying
¸k+1
¸k · 1 ¡ ¸1 for all k. Endow each h 2 H with the
sequence of habit coe±cients f¸k;hgk¸1 given by ¸k;h = ¸k
®+limsupk0 hk0
¯+limsupk0 hk0, where ¯ > ® > 0.














Then the family of utilities fUhgh2H satis¯es HC(i) and (ii), but violates HC(iii).17
Example 3.4 demonstrates that Axiom HC(iii) is directly responsible for the homogene-
ity of the habit formation coe±cients across consumption histories but is not necessary
for linearity. Moreover, the habit formation coe±cients in the example can only depend
on the tail behavior of the consumption history; otherwise, Axioms HC(i) and DC would
be violated. Similarly, note that we may also generate linearity without Axiom DC. An
alternative model where the DM has preferences represented by linear habit formation
with naive hyperbolic time discounting would satisfy all of our axioms except DC. Even
stationarity plays a minimal role: we could replace the felicity in the representation with a
non-stationary variant ut(¢) without violating HC or GM.
These examples correctly suggest that the compensating streams are constructed only
from the habit formation coe±cients, and are entirely independent of the DM's felicity and
Figure 1 one indi®erence curve is behind the other.
17The felicity should be acyclic (see Section 4) to ensure that compensation is unique.
15discount factor. Therefore, there is an important sense in which Axioms HC(i) and HC(iii)
di®er from Axiom HC(ii). Axiom HC(ii) is a generalized separability axiom and does not
provide a particular structure for the compensating streams. While Axioms HC(i) and
HC(iii) directly generate the habit formation coe±cients, Axioms HC(ii) and DC together
generate the manner in which the DM aggregates her utility over time. The compensating
streams would still exist and satisfy Axiom HC(iii) even in a variation of our model of
linear habit formation where utility is not time-additive. However, Axiom HC(ii) would be
violated.
Finally, we require two additional technical conditions on the DM's initial level of com-
pensation. These conditions concern the strength of the DM's memory and rule out de-
generate representations of the preferences we seek. First, we require that the initial com-
pensation needed for a habit goes to zero as that habit becomes more distant in memory:
i.e., for any habit h 2 H we have limt!1 d
~ 0;h0t
0 = 0. In counterpoint, the second condition
states that for any ¯xed prior date of consumption, we can ¯nd two habits that di®er widely
enough on that date to generate any initial level of compensation: i.e., for any q > 0 and k,
there exist (h0;h) 2 H that agree on Nnfkg and satisfy d
h0;h
0 = q. The ¯rst condition is re-
quired only for histories of in¯nite length: it rules out an undesirable term inside the utility
that depends only on tail elements of the habit. The second condition rules out degenerate
solutions of a critical functional equation.18 We say the DM's memory is non-degenerate if
these two conditions hold.
Axiom NDM (Non-Degenerate Memory) The DM's memory is non-degenerate.
4 The main representation theorem
We now present our main theorem, which o®ers a precise characterization of the preferences
that satisfy our axioms of habit formation. The representation obtained is a dynamically
consistent and additive model of intrinsic linear habit formation that has featured promi-
nently in the applied literature. The model permits any choice of felicity, subject to a minor
acyclicity condition that will soon be explained.
18A very weak technical assumption, which we discuss in the Appendix, would also su±ce.
16Theorem 4.1 (Main representation theorem). The family of preferences º satis¯es Axioms














8 c 2 C; (2)
where ± 2 (0;1); the habit formation coe±cients f¸kgk¸1 are unique and satisfy
¸k 2 (0;1) and
¸k+1
¸k
· 1 ¡ ¸1 for all k ¸ 1; (3)
and the felicity u : R ! R satis¯es the following conditions:
(i) Continuous, weakly increasing, unique up to positive a±ne transformation
(ii) If
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1 then u(¢) increases strictly on (0;1) and is not \quasi-cyclic"19
(iii) If
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1 then there exists 0 < a · 1 such that u(¢) increases strictly either on
(¡a;1) or (¡1;a) and is not \cyclic."
The discount factor ±, coe±cients f¸kg, and felicity u(¢) are independent of h.
The proof, which is outlined in Section 4.1, is given in Appendices B (su±ciency) and
C (necessity). As can be seen from the proof, the monotonicity requirements on u(¢) can
be dropped by weakening Axiom GM to GS. The representation theorem is otherwise
unchanged (in particular, the acyclicity conditions remain).
Corollary 4.2 (Main representation theorem, non-monotonic felicity). The family of pref-
erence relations º satis¯es Axioms PR, C, DC, GS, HC, and NDM if and only if each ºh
can be represented as in Theorem 4.1 but without the monotonicity requirements on u(¢) in
assertions (i)-(iii).
An important implication of these two results is that the compensating sequences are
unique for nearly all economic applications of linear habit formation. Moreover, we will
soon see that they are determined independently of the DM's exact felicity and discount
factor. The proof of the theorem shows that compensation is uniquely determined if an
appropriate acyclicity condition holds. Once we explain the meaning of this condition, it
will be evident that it essentially never binds in practice.
19The de¯nitions of the terms quasi-cyclic and cyclic follow the theorem.
17De¯nition 4.3. A function u : R ! R is cyclic if there are ® 2 R and ° > 0 such that
u(x+°) = u(x)+® for all x 2 R. A function u: R ! R is quasi-cyclic if there are ® 2 R
and ¯;° > 0 such that u(x + °) = ¯u(x) + ® for all x 2 R.20
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Violations of acyclicity. (a) ¯ = 1; (b) ¯ > 1; (c) ¯ = 1 and a±ne.
Some cyclic and quasi-cyclic functions are illustrated in Figure 2. In light of De¯nition
4.3, the class of felicities permitted by the representation contains nearly all felicities used
in models of habit formation. Unless it is a±ne, a quasi-cyclic function cannot be both
smooth and concave. Furthermore, even a non-concave felicity such as the well-known S-
shaped function of prospect theory cannot be quasi-cyclic; indeed, quasi-cyclic functions
cannot have a ¯nite (and non-zero) number of kinks. Finally, while a±ne functions are
technically cyclic, they are not particularly well-suited to models of linear habit formation
since choice behavior would be observationally equivalent to that in a model without habit
formation.
4.1 Roadmap to the proof
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is constructive. In this section we o®er a roadmap to a few of
the main steps of the construction. Before doing so, let us gain insight into the proof by
examining why Axiom HC(i) is implied by the utility representation.
Consider a DM whose family of preferences º may be represented as in Theorem 4.1
and choose any ordered pair of habits (h0;h) 2 H. The DM's utility from a stream c 2 C








under h. However, observe that we may
20Notice that a cyclic function is quasi-cyclic with ¯ = 1.
















Since the habit aggregator '(¢) is a strictly increasing linear functional, the bracketed term




Our observation in (4) aids in the construction of the compensating streams. Indeed,
let us generate the compensating stream dh0;h. In period 0, we provide the DM with the
amount d
h0;h
0 = '(h ¡ h0); as seen from (4), the DM's period-0 felicity from consuming
c0 + d
h0;h
0 under habit h is the same as her period-0 felicity from consuming c0 under habit
h0. In the following period, we must take into account that we have compensated the DM
using the habit forming good; that is, we must compensate for the compensation. The
period-0 consumption level that corresponds to habit h in (4) is c0 + d
h0;h
0 . Using linearity,




h ¡ h0;'(h ¡ h0)
¢
. Continuing in this manner, we ¯nd a






















In light of (5), it is evident that our constructive proof should de¯ne the habit aggregator
'(h) by d
~ 0;h
0 . Therefore, the ¯rst task at hand is to prove that d
~ 0;h
0 will have the desired
linear structure under our axioms.
Constructing the linear habit aggregator ' : H ! R+
The utility representation given in Theorem 4.1 stipulates that the desired habit aggregator
'(¢) satis¯es three properties: (i) there exist functions 'k : Q ! R+ such that for each
h 2 H, '(¢) can be written in the additive form '(h) =
P1
k=1 'k(hk); (ii) each 'k(¢) is
strictly increasing and linear, i.e. 'k(q) = ¸kq for some ¸k > 0; and (iii) the sequence
f¸kgk¸1 decays at least geometrically fast and sums to no more than one:
¸k+1
¸k · 1 ¡ ¸1.
Lemmas B.2-B.3 demonstrate that Axiom HC(i) is the key axiom generating the un-
derlying additivity of '(¢). Recall that the compensating stream is consumed as a ¯xed
supplement to regular consumption, akin to the manner in which a nicotine patch is ad-
ministered. This patch-like structure permits each dh0;h to be written as an in¯nite sum of
19successive one-step transitions from h0 to h, where only one element is changed at a time.
Axiom HC(iii) ensures that the order in which the successive one-step compensations occur
is unimportant; but each one-step compensation may still depend on the entire initial habit
level h0. Within the additive structure generated by Axiom HC(i), however, we prove that
a one-step compensation is genuinely independent of all elements left unchanged. Thus,
we may denote the compensation for changing the k-th element of a habit from 0 to q as
dk;0;q without any loss of generality. Given the ¯rst part of Axiom NDM, which rules out




k=1 dk;0;hk. Hence we naturally de¯ne each 'k(¢) by 'k(q) = d
k;0;q
0 for q > 0 and
'k(0) = 0.
Axiom HC(i) posits the existence of compensating streams; to determine their actual
form we utilize the dynamics of the problem. In Lemmas B.5-B.7 we use Axiom HC(i)
in conjunction with DC and HC(iii) to manipulate the compensating sequences dk;0;q and
show that each 'k(¢) satis¯es the functional equation
'k('k(q) + q
0) = 'k('k(q)) + 'k(q
0) 8 q;q
0 2 Q: (6)
Equation (6) is a restricted Cauchy equation that is complicated by the fact that the
domain on which it holds is endogenous; as a consequence, the solution of this functional
equation has not been fully characterized.21 One known result is that of Jarczyk (1991),
which states that a continuous function 'k : [0;1) ! [0;1) solving (6) must take the
form 'k(q) = ¸kq for some ¸k > 0. However, we may only conclude that 'k(¢) is almost
everywhere continuous using Axiom HC(i). The second part of Axiom NDM ensures that
the range of each 'k(¢) is the entire domain Q; reparametrization then reduces (6) to the
simple Cauchy equation, for which almost everywhere continuity su±ces to ensure linearity.
In Lemma B.11 we suggest replacing the second component of Axiom NDM with a very
weak alternative condition that can be shown to rule out discontinuities of 'k(¢) on sets of
measure zero, thereby permitting us to directly apply the theorem of Jarczyk.
Let us examine the properties of these coe±cients f¸kgk¸1. Recall that the compen-
sation required to the wean the DM is weakly decreasing. Lemma B.13 shows that the
21A function f : R ! R satis¯es the Cauchy functional equation on some domain X if for every x0;x 2 X,
f(x0 + x) = f(x0) + f(x).
20\fading" nature of compensation corresponds directly to the geometric decay of the habit
formation coe±cients. The critical result used to prove this is Lemma B.12, which re-
cursively characterizes compensation by td







t¡1. In light of the de¯nition
d
~ 0;h
0 = '(h), this implies that d
~ 0;h
1 = '(h'(h)), d
~ 0;h
2 = '(h'(h)'(h'(h))), etc. Earlier
we obtained this characterization from the desired representation; Lemma B.12 obtains it
directly from the axioms.
Construction of an auxiliary space and preference relation
Using the '(¢) just constructed, de¯ne the transformation g : H £ C ! £1
i=0R by
g(h;c) = (c0 ¡ '(h);c1 ¡ '(hc0);c2 ¡ '(hc0c1);:::)
Let C¤ = g(H £ C) and C¤
h = g(fhg;C) be the image and projected images of g,
respectively.22 C¤ is the set of all habit-adjusted consumption streams and C¤
h is the set of
all h-adjusted consumption streams.
From here on we will be working solely in this auxiliary space C¤, rather than in the
actual consumption space C. To understand the structure of C¤ we must examine the
properties of g(¢;¢). We prove in Lemma B.17 that g(¢;¢) is continuous and that g(h;¢)
is a homeomorphism into C¤
h for each h 2 H. However, g(¢;¢) itself fails to be invertible
because it violates injectivity. Because each c¤ 2 C¤ is generated from some h 2 H and






















which maps h-adjusted consumption back to regular consumption. The di±culty is that a
single c¤ may belong to in¯nitely many sets C¤
h. In fact, Lemma B.18 uses Axiom HC(i) to
show that the projection sets are nested: C¤
h0 µ C¤
h for all h0 · h.
This failure of injectivity plays an important role in the analysis. First, it permits
us to prove in Lemma B.19 that C¤ is a separable space. Separability will be needed to
obtain a utility representation for a continuous preference that we will construct on C¤.
To that end, we de¯ne an auxiliary relation º¤ on C¤ £ C¤ by c ºh c0 if and only if
22We endow the space £1
i=0R with the product topology; metrize H £ C by ½H£C((h;c);(h0;c0)) =
½H(h;h0) + ½C(c;c0); and consider C¤ as a metric subspace of £1
i=0R.
21g(h;c) º¤ g(h;c0). This says that the DM prefers the stream c to c0 at habit h if and only
if she ranks the corresponding habit-adjusted consumption streams likewise. Although º¤
is de¯ned through every h, our notation is independent of h. How do we know that º¤
is well-de¯ned, i.e., how can we rule out a situation where the DM prefers the h-adjusted
consumption stream corresponding to c in one case and the h0-adjusted consumption stream
corresponding to c0 in the other?
The proof of this result, given in Lemma B.20, o®ers insight into the workings of en-
dogenously de¯ned auxiliary relations. In essence, º¤ is well-de¯ned due to the ability to
(i) write C¤ as a countable union of overlapping projections and (ii) use the compensating
streams to maneuver between the various habits from which º¤ may be derived without
a®ecting the preference. To see this, observe that we may rewrite the de¯nition of º¤ as
c¤ º¤ _ c¤ if and only if c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤
h and g¡1(h;c¤) ºh g¡1(h; _ c¤) for some h 2 H. Suppose there
are h;h0 and c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤
h;C¤
h0 with g¡1(h;c¤) ºh g¡1(h; _ c¤) and g¡1(h0; _ c¤) Âh0 g¡1(h0;c¤).
Take ¹ h ¸ h0;h. By nestedness, c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤
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But we can show that g¡1(h;c¤) + dh;¹ h and g¡1(h0;c¤) + dh0;¹ h are both equal to g¡1(¹ h;c¤)
(and similarly for _ c¤), implying that (8) consists of the contradictory statements a º b and
b Â a. Hence º¤ is well-de¯ned. The other properties required to obtain a continuous utility
representation for º¤ (completeness, transitivity, and continuity) also hinge on Axiom HC(i)
and are proved in Lemma B.21.
Obtaining additivity on the auxiliary space
While the DM's preferences are neither additively separable, monotonic, nor dynamically
consistent in a manner independent of history, we can prove that the auxiliary preference
relation º¤ does satisfy these properties.
While additive separability conditions are normally de¯ned on the consumption set
itself, our additive separability conditions must hold for the endogenously de¯ned preference
º¤ on the endogenously de¯ned space C¤. Due to the transformation between the two
spaces, a known separability condition in C¤ would translate directly into an unintelligible
condition in C. Consequently we impose a simpli¯ed condition on C, Axiom HC(ii), which
22has the °avor of a separability axiom. Given our other axioms, we can show that Axiom
HC(ii) implies the separability conditions of Gorman (1968, Theorem 1) in the auxiliary
space.23
Gorman reformulates the standard conditions for additive separability.24 His condi-
tions assert that the set of separable indices is closed under unions, intersections, and
di®erences given certain restrictions on the preference and its domain. In combination
with our prior results, Lemmas B.22 and B.27 will ensure that Gorman's restrictions
are not violated. Using Gorman's theorem and the dynamic consistency of º¤ (shown
in Lemma B.23), the conditions of Koopmans (1960) will hold on the auxiliary space if
(c¤t;¹ c¤) º¤ (^ c¤t;¹ c¤) i® (c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤) º¤ (^ c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤) for any t ¸ 0 and c¤;^ c¤;¹ c¤;¹ ¹ c¤ 2 C¤ such that
(c¤t;¹ c¤), (^ c¤t;¹ c¤), (c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤), (^ c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤) 2 C¤.
We must show these conditions hold on the entire space C¤. However, they do not
correspond directly to Axiom HC(ii) using the \natural inverse" given in (7). Instead, to
ensure that HC(ii) implies Gorman's conditions hold on all of C¤ we must prove that the









is surjective. Here the failure of g(¢;¢) to be injective once again plays the central role.
Previously, we noted that C¤
h0 µ C¤
h for h ¸ h0. To show that the map »t is surjective we
must understand how the projection sets C¤
h and C¤
h0 may overlap even when h0;h cannot
be ordered. The requisite proofs are given in Lemmas B.24-B.26.
5 Recovering the habit formation coe±cients
In this section we demonstrate how to use a single compensating stream to recover a
DM's entire sequence of habit formation coe±cients, regardless of her particular felicity,
discount factor, or consumption history. In doing so we o®er a partial response to the
\free parameters" critique as it applies to the model of linear habit formation. While
23The only other paper of which we are aware that applies Gorman-type conditions to in¯nite streams
in order to obtain a discounted utility representation is Bleichrodt, Rohde & Wakker (2007), which is
unrelated to habit formation.
24See Fishburn (1970) for an excellent discussion of the standard additivity theories.
23the indi®erence curves of a DM can determine her utility only up to a strictly increasing
transformation, they uniquely determine the entire sequence f¸kgk¸1 of habit formation
coe±cients for a DM satisfying our axioms.
Proposition 5.1 (Independent recovery). The DM's entire sequence of habit formation
coe±cients f¸kgk¸1 can be recovered directly from observed choice behavior. In particular,
f¸kgk¸1 may be found using a single compensating stream, without knowledge of the DM's
felicity, discount factor, or consumption history.
The habit formation coe±cients may be recovered without regard to the DM's felicity
or discount factor because the compensating streams are constructs only of the arguments
of the DM's utility over streams - not of the utility itself. Moreover, the same choice
experiment may be applied regardless of the DM's initial habit.
To see this, suppose that the DM has some arbitrary habit ~ h 2 H. Choose any strictly
positive q 2 Q and let h0 = ~ h0 and h = ~ hq.25 Using dynamic consistency, the choice
experiment required to ¯nd the compensating stream dh0;h, in which only the most recent
consumption memory is a®ected, takes a simple form. The compensating stream dh0;h is
the unique d 2 C satisfying
(0;c) º~ h (0;c
0) if and only if (q;c + d) º~ h (q;c
0 + d) for all c
0;c 2 C (9)
Under our axioms, the compensating stream dh0;h depends only on h¡h0; consequently
the choice experiment (9) delivers the same compensating stream regardless of the initial
habit ~ h. Recall that the proof of Theorem 4.1 demonstrates that for any (h0;h) 2 H the






















Since dh0;h is determined independently of the felicity and discount factor, the task of
recovering the entire sequence of habit formation coe±cients f¸kgk¸1 may now be easily
accomplished. Given the linearity of '(¢) and the recursive characterization (10), knowing
the compensating stream dh0;h means that the entire sequence f¸kgk¸1 can be determined
25The choice of 0 is arbitrary and could be replaced by any date-0 consumption level q0 2 Q with q0 < q.
In the triangular linear system that follows q must then be replaced by (q ¡ q0).


























6 The autoregressive model and habit decay
We now examine the rate at which habits fade as they become more distant in time,
i.e. the rate at which the DM's habit stock decays. As seen in Appendix D, the utility
representation in Theorem 4.1 contains too many parameters to o®er a succinct measure
of habit decay. To that end, we use a frequently invoked autoregressive speci¯cation of
the habit aggregator to facilitate such a characterization. According to that model, there
exist ®;¯ > 0 with ® + ¯ · 1 such that the habit aggregator satis¯es the autoregressive
law of motion '(hq) = ®'(h) + ¯q for all h 2 H and q 2 Q.26 In this section we examine
the implications of this simpli¯cation for choice behavior. Speci¯cally, we show that the
autoregressive structure of the habit aggregator corresponds to an additional axiom that
can calibrate the habit decay parameter ® in that model.
6.1 A simple choice experiment
Let us consider a DM facing two possible scenarios, A and B, each of which determine
today's consumption level only. In scenario A the DM has a very high level of consumption
today, whereas in scenario B she has a very low level of consumption today. The DM's
preferences tomorrow will di®er based on how much she consumes today. We would like
to know whether the single consumption level determined by these two scenarios has an
irreversible e®ect on the DM's behavior. That is, if the DM were to consume very little
for some time after scenario A and very much for some time after scenario B, could the
26This model appears in Boldrin, Christiano & Fisher (1997) in our discrete time form and in Constan-
tinides (1990) and Schroder & Skiadas (2002) in the continuous time version.
25opposing e®ects from consumption cancel so that her preferences following each scenario
eventually coincide? The next axiom describes a choice behavior for which such equilibra-
tion is possible.
Axiom IE (Immediate Equilibration) For all c0;^ c0 2 Q, there exist c1;^ c1 2 Q such that
for all ¹ c;¹ ¹ c 2 C, (c0;c1;¹ c) ºh (c0;c1;¹ ¹ c) if and only if (^ c0;^ c1;¹ c) ºh (^ c0;^ c1;¹ ¹ c).
In light of dynamic consistency, Axiom IE implies that ºhc0c1 and ºh^ c0^ c1 describe the
same preferences. Therefore, the axiom says that we can undo by tomorrow the e®ect of a
di®erence in consumption today.
We would like to use Axiom IE to provide a comparative measure of habit decay. Let
us ¯x any period-0 consumption levels ^ c0 > c0 and consider the corresponding period-1
consumption levels ^ c1;c1 that are given by Axiom IE. Intuitively, if the DM's habits decay
slowly then the e®ects of prior consumption linger strongly, so c1 will have to be quite large
and ^ c1 will have to be quite small in order to o®set the initial di®erence. More formally,
for ¯xed ^ c0 > c0 one would expect that the di®erence c1 ¡ ^ c1 in the period-1 consumption
levels required by Axiom IE should be larger for those DM's whose habits decay more
slowly. This intuition is con¯rmed by the following representation theorem, which reveals
that Axiom IE implies habits decay at the constant rate
c1¡^ c1
^ c0¡c0.
Theorem 6.1 (Autoregressive habit formation). The family of preference relations º sat-







as in Theorem 4.1 and in addition there exist ®;¯ > 0
with ®+¯ · 1 such that the habit aggregator '(¢) satis¯es the autoregressive law of motion
'(hq) = ®'(h) + ¯q 8 h 2 H; q 2 Q: (11)
Moreover, using the values c0;c1;^ c0; ^ c1 for any h from Axiom IE, ® is given by
® =
c1 ¡ ^ c1
^ c0 ¡ c0
: (12)
Remark 6.2. For ¯nite histories of length K ¸ 3, the habit aggregator cannot be written
in the form (11) but the result of Theorem 6.1 is unchanged: the ratio of successive habit
formation coe±cients
¸k+1
¸k is constant and given by
c1¡^ c1
^ c0¡c0.
Theorem 6.1 reveals that the autoregressive model corresponds precisely to the choice
26behavior of Axiom IE, and that the choice experiment provided directly calibrates the
parameter ®. The proof of this theorem appears in the Appendix.27
Observe that the choice experiment in Axiom IE immediately recovers the single pa-
rameter ¸ in the geometric coe±cients model, where the aggregator satis¯es the law of
motion '(hq) = (1 ¡ ¸)'(h) + ¸q 8 h 2 H and q 2 Q. By the result in Theorem 6.1 we
know that the DM must also satisfy Axiom IE and that
¸ = 1 ¡
c1 ¡ ^ c1
^ c0 ¡ c0
; (13)
where the values c0;c1;^ c0; ^ c1 are found from Axiom IE and are independent of h.
Finally, observe that the autoregressive model has two free parameters, ® and ¯, and
that the e®ect of a prior di®erence in consumption can be undone in one period. The
proof of Theorem 2 actually suggests a more general result. It can similarly be shown that
a generalization of the autoregressive model that has n free parameters corresponds to a
generalized n¡1 period version of equilibration in which it takes n¡1 periods to undo the
e®ect of a single di®erence in consumption.
7 Persistent versus responsive habits
We now return to the general setting of linear habit formation and suggest a universal
characterization of the DM's habit-forming tendencies. We distinguish between two types
of preferences that satisfy our axioms, those whose habits are responsive to weaning and
those whose habits are persistent.
Recall that Axiom HC sheds light on how the preferences of the DM transform as she
goes from a lower habit h0 to a higher habit h: the indi®erence curves for the preference ºh0
are translated up by dh0;h into indi®erence curves for ºh. Stated di®erently, dh0;h measures
the distance between the indi®erence curves of ºh0 and ºh. Whether the DM can be
weaned easily using a small and quickly fading stream of compensation, or must be weaned
using possibly high levels of consumption that fade slowly - or never at all - will determine
27Axiom GM may be relaxed to GS with the obvious relaxation of monotonicity. Also, consider the
following alternative to IE: 8 h, 9 q 2 Q s.t. for all ¹ c;¹ ¹ c 2 C, ¹ c ºh ¹ ¹ c i® (q;¹ c) ºh (q;¹ ¹ c). It can be shown by
that this axiom may replace Axiom IE in our axiomatization of the autoregressive model. However this
alternative axiom does not provide a means to calibrate the parameter ®.
27how profoundly consumption a®ects her preferences. In particular, we can characterize the
DM's habit-forming tendencies by whether or not the total amount of compensation she
requires over time is ¯nite.
De¯nition 7.1. The DM is responsive to weaning if she can always be weaned using a





is ¯nite. The DM has persistent habits if she can never be weaned using a ¯nite amount of





A responsive DM would respond well to a \packaged" drug cessation aid such as the
nicotine patch; but if she has persistent habits, no ¯nite number of nicotine patches will
cure her of her habit. Note that our de¯nition requires that a DM's total compensation is
always ¯nite or always in¯nite for every pair of habits (h0;h) 2 H. But what about a DM
who requires a ¯nite amount of total compensation for some pairs of habits, and an in¯nite
amount for others? We show in the following proposition that such a DM cannot exist.
Furthermore, we show that the compensation required by a persistent DM not only sums
to in¯nity, but remains forever constant. A similar phenomenon may be seen in heroin
addicts weaned using the drug methadone: while the vast majority of methadone patients
eventually taper their use, some patients receive a steady dose of the drug for the rest of
their lives (Bertschy (1995)).
Proposition 7.2 (The dichotomy). Suppose the DM's preference º satis¯es Axioms PR,
C, DC, GS, HC, and NDM. Then the following statements hold.28
(i) The DM's habits must be either responsive or persistent.
(ii) Her habits are responsive to weaning if and only if
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1.
(iii) Her habits are persistent if and only if each compensating stream is constant.
Because her total compensation is ¯nite, the compensating streams of a responsive DM
must tend to zero. In contrast, the compensation of a persistent DM never decreases.
Since a DM who satis¯es our axioms has persistent habits if and only if the ratio
¸k+1
¸k = 1¡¸1 for every k, persistent habits correspond directly to the model of linear habit
formation with geometric coe±cients, in which there exists ¸ 2 (0;1) such that the habit
28The proof follows from Lemmas B.15-B.16 in the Appendix.
28aggregator '(¢) satis¯es the law of motion '(hq) = (1¡¸)'(h)+¸q for all h 2 H and q 2 Q.
In comparison, consider the more general autoregressive model of linear habit formation
axiomatized in Theorem 6.1, which speci¯es that there exist ®;¯ > 0 with ® + ¯ · 1
such that the habit aggregator satis¯es '(hq) = ®'(h) + ¯q for all h 2 H and q 2 Q.
While it collapses to the geometric coe±cients model when ® + ¯ = 1, the autoregressive
model provides an additional degree of freedom that accommodates responsive habits when
® + ¯ < 1. As the DM's habit-forming tendencies are quite di®erent under responsive and
persistent habits, the choice of ® + ¯ in this commonly used model should be made with
care.
In order to understand how choice behavior di®ers under responsive and persistent
habits, the following proposition examines the rate at which compensation fades when
habits are responsive. In light of the translation of indi®erence curves depicted in Figure
1, the result demonstrates how sharply choice behavior may di®er at di®erent habits when
the sum
P1
k=1 ¸k is exactly one or very slightly below one, ceteris paribus. In contrast to
the case of persistent habits, the compensating streams of a DM with responsive habits
decrease at least geometrically fast within ¯nite time; and when h > h0, the decrease is
immediate.
Proposition 7.3 (Geometric decay of compensation). Let the DM's preference º satisfy
PR, C, DC, GS, HC, and NDM. Suppose her habits are responsive, i.e. for some k¤ the
ratio
¸k¤+1
¸k¤ < 1 ¡ ¸1. Let " = 1 ¡ ¸1 ¡
¸k¤+1
¸k¤ . Then compensation decreases at least at a













· 1 ¡ "¸k¤ < 1:
Moreover, if h > h0 then compensation immediately begins to strictly decrease (at least at




< 1 ¡ ¸1).
Proposition 7.3 suggests that persistent habits are a knife-edge case in terms of their
implied behavior. As seen from the upper bound 1¡"¸k¤ on the rate of decrease for t > k¤,
if
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1 ¡ ° then behavior sharply deviates from that of a persistent DM if most
of the ° decrease can be attributed to a drop in
¸k¤+1





is strictly positive compensation decreases at an exactly geometric rate.
29case, compensation decreases rapidly very early and the translation of the indi®erence map
between two habits (h0;h) 2 H is much milder than it would be if habits were persistent.
It may be best to think of persistent habits as a limiting case of a sequence of responsive
habits f¸n
kgk¸1, for each of which
P1
k=1 ¸n
k = 1 ¡ °n < 1 and where each °n is attributed
to a drop in a more distant ratio of habit coe±cients.
Finally, we examine the di®erent welfare e®ects of persistent and responsive habits
by considering the DM's valuation for streams that provide at least some subsistence level
q > 0 in every period. To ¯x ideas, suppose that whenever the argument of the DM's felicity
is negative she su®ers a feeling of loss relative to her accustomed level of consumption;
conversely, whenever the argument of the felicity is positive she derives some enjoyment
from the stream. Can there be an initial habit so high and a consumption stream so
\disappointing" that the DM su®ers every period? The following proposition shows that
the model of linear habit formation implies a certain \resilience of spirit" in eventually
overcoming losses. However, while a DM with responsive habits will always \appreciate"
a consumption stream that is bounded away from zero, the same cannot be said of a DM
with persistent habits, who may be more \fastidious."30
Proposition 7.4. Suppose that the DM's preference º satis¯es Axioms PR, C, DC, GS,
HC, and NDM. Then,
(i) (Resilience): For any ° < 0, there does not exist a stream c 2 C and a habit h 2 H
such that ct ¡ '(hct¡1) · ° for every t.
(ii) (Fastidiousness): If the DM's habits are persistent, then for any q > 0 there is a habit
h 2 H and stream c 2 C with c ¸ (q;q;:::) such that ct ¡ '(hct¡1) · 0 for every t.
(iii) (Appreciativeness): If the DM's habits are responsive, then for any q > 0 there does
not exist a habit h 2 H and a stream c 2 C with c ¸ (q;q;:::) such that ct¡'(hct¡1) ·
0 for every t.
Proposition 7.4 implies that a DM who satis¯es our axioms will ultimately overcome
any level of loss, but a consumption stream o®ering at least some subsistence level q > 0
30We also note a related result that has implications for the use of felicities satisfying the Inada condition
limx!0 u0(x) = 1 when habits are persistent. Indeed, when
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1 there cannot exist a stream c 2 C
and habit h 2 H such that habit-adjusted consumption ct¡'(hct¡1) is always strictly positive and bounded
away from zero.
30may not be appreciated by a DM with persistent habits. While a persistent DM may never
derive any enjoyment from such a stream, iterated application of Proposition 7.4 implies
that a responsive DM will derive enjoyment from it in¯nitely often. As seen in Appendix
C.1, Proposition 7.4 is the root of the di®erent monotonicity requirements for responsive
and persistent habits.31
8 Multidimensional habit formation
In this section we extend our analysis to a multidimensional framework that can accommo-
date models of addiction. Moreover, as noted in Deaton (1987), a multidimensional model
of habit formation of the type we axiomatize can explain observed patterns of consumption
that are irreconcilable with the standard life-cycle model of consumer behavior (e.g., excess
sensitivity of consumption to income).
The commodity space is now Q = Rn
+, n ¸ 1. To ¯x ideas, we interpret q 2 Q as
a bundle of goods and permit the DM to form habits over only a subset of these goods.
Suppose that n ¸ 2 and that the DM only forms habits over goods f1;2;:::;Mg, where
1 · M · n. For any m · n and q 2 Q, qm will correspond to the consumption level of the
m-th good in the bundle q. We let Qm = fq 2 Q j q ^ m = 0 8 ^ m 6= mg be the set of bundles
o®ering good m only.
In order to simplify the notation we include all goods in the DM's consumption his-
tory, with the understanding that her preferences are independent of her past consump-
tion of the non-habit forming goods. The set of consumption histories is given by H =
fh 2 £1
k=1Q jsupm·n;k¸1 hm:k < 1 g, where hm:k denotes her consumption of the m-
th good k periods ago. For any h 2 H, hm = (:::;hm:2;hm:1) denotes the restriction of
the history to the m-th good. The set of consumption streams is given by C = fc 2
£1
t=0Q jsupm·n;t¸0 cm:t < 1g, where cm:t denotes the consumption of good m in period t
and cm is the stream (cm:0;cm:1;:::). We de¯ne the set Cm = fc 2 C j c ^ m:t = 0 8 ^ m 6=
m;t ¸ 0 g to be the set of consumption streams o®ering good m only.
As before, h(t) = hct¡1 is the date-t consumption history that results from consuming
the stream c given the initial habit h. The restriction of h(t) to the m-th good is denoted
31The assertions in Proposition 7.4 follow from the proofs of Lemmas B.31, B.33 and C.1. We note the
result is independent of Axiom GM, though the interpretation presumes some monotonicity.
31h
(t)
m . The set H of ordered pairs of habits is de¯ned as before, with a slight modi¯cation
of the notion of habits agreeing. We say the pair (h0;h) agree on a date k and a good m
if hm:k = h0
m:k. We say (h0;h) agree on a date k if for every m, (h0;h) agree on k and m.
Finally, for each (h0;h) 2 H it will be convenient to de¯ne the set
C(h
0;h) = fc 2 C j for all t ¸ 0 and m · n; cm:t > 0 i® m · M and hm 6= h
0
mg:
This is the set of streams where the consumption of the m-th good is strictly positive if
and only if it is a habit-forming good for which the good-speci¯c histories di®er.
Let us now consider the extension of our axioms to the multidimensional case. Using
the newly de¯ned notation, only the statements of Axioms GS, HC, and NDM must be
modi¯ed. In particular, we need only impose Gains Sensitivity for a single habit-forming
good. That is, for some good m · M there must be a uniform increase in consumption
that leaves the DM either strictly better or strictly worse.
Axiom GS¦ There exist c 2 C, m · M, and ® 2 Qm such that c + ® 6»h c.
Axiom HC requires modi¯cation of parts (i) and (iii). First, a compensating stream is
positive only along habit-forming dimensions from which the DM is being weaned. More-
over, we need only require uniqueness of compensating streams that wean the DM from
a single habit-forming good. Next, HC(iii) takes on a dual meaning: in addition to com-
pensation satisfying the same condition as before along each good, the axiom posits that
compensation is independent across goods.
Axiom HC¦ There is a collection fdh0;hg(h0;h)2H of streams such that
(i) (Weaning): Each dh0;h 2 C(h0;h), is weakly decreasing, and satis¯es
c ºh0 c




0 2 C; (14)
and if dh0;h 2 Cm for some m · M then it uniquely satis¯es (14) in Cm.








t;¹ c + d
h0;hct
) ºh (^ c
t;¹ c + d
h0;h^ ct
) 8 ¹ c 2 C:
32(iii) (Independence of Irrelevant Habits): Take any ^ k; ^ m ¸ 1 and q ^ m. If the pairs of






^ m:k k 6= ^ k
q ^ m k = ^ k
and




h ^ m:k k 6= ^ k
q ^ m k = ^ k
for all k, then d
h0;h
^ m = d
^ h0;^ h
^ m .
Observe that while the statement of HC(ii) has not changed, it has become a hybrid
separability condition that accommodates both the habit-forming and non-habit forming
dimensions of consumption.
Next, we impose Axiom NDM only along the habit-forming dimensions.
Axiom NDM¦(i) For any m · M and h 2 H, limt!1 d
~ 0;h0t
m:0 = 0; (ii) For any m · M,
qm > 0 and k, there exist (h0;h) 2 H agreeing on N n fkg with d
h0;h
m:0 = qm.
Before presenting the multidimensional representation, we rede¯ne the notions of cyclic-
ity and quasi-cyclicity. For any function u : Rn ! R and any x 2 Rn, de¯ne the restriction
um;x : R ! R by um;x(¢) = u(x1;:::;xm¡1;¢;xm+1;:::;xn). Then, u is quasi-cyclic in the
m-th good if there exists x 2 Rn such that the restriction um;x is quasi-cyclic; similarly, u
is cyclic in the m-th good if there is x 2 Rn such that the restriction um;x is cyclic.
Given this reformulation of the framework, we have the following extension of our main
representation theorem to the multidimensional setting, in which the DM forms indepen-
dent linear habits over the ¯rst M goods.
Theorem 8.1 (Multidimensional habit formation). The family of preference relations º


















33where the coe±cients f¸m:kgk¸1 2 R for the m-th good are unique and satisfy
¸m:k 2 (0;1) and
¸m:k+1
¸m:k
· 1 ¡ ¸m:1 for all k ¸ 1: (16)
The felicity u : Rn ! R is continuous, unique up to positive a±ne transformation, and
satis¯es the following acyclicity conditions: for each m · M, u(¢) is not quasi-cyclic in the
m-th good if
P1
k=1 ¸m:k < 1 and is not cyclic in the m-th good if
P1
k=1 ¸m:k = 1.32
If there are exactly two habit-forming goods and one regular consumption good, our
model is a special linear case of that in Palacios-Huerta (2003), which demonstrates the
existence of addiction cycles in a model of multiple independent habits.33
9 Extensions
In this paper we have provided theoretical foundations for intrinsic linear habit formation
by introducing the device of compensating a DM for giving up her habits. We have also
o®ered separability and monotonicity axioms appropriate for nonseparable preferences. In
addition to accommodating consumption histories of various lengths and clarifying the
di®erences between nested speci¯cations of the model, our axiomatic approach is °exible
enough to accommodate other incarnations of habit formation. We conclude by brie°y
discussing some of these extensions.
First, suppose that the DM instead cares about, and forms habits over, the rate of
growth of her consumption over time. Formally, assume that consumption is bounded be-
low by some small " > 0 and that the DM forms habits over the logarithms of her past
consumption levels, (:::;logh2;logh1), rather than over her actual consumption history.
Similarly, suppose that her preferences are de¯ned over streams of logarithms of consump-
tion (logc0;logc1;:::). Consider our axioms in this new setting. For example, in Axiom
HC(i), the DM would have to be compensated in terms of rates of consumption growth
rather than using consumption itself. In terms of the implications of GM, one stream would
gains-dominate another if its period-to-period growth rate is larger. Applying our main
representation theorem we would obtain a utility representation of habit formation where
32The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.1.
33In contrast, cycles in Becker & Murphy (1988) require one dimension to have two stocks.
34the DM cares about the ratio of her current consumption level to a geometric average of
her prior consumption levels. That is, she behaves as if her history dependent utility over












habit formation coe±cients f¸kgk¸1 satisfy the same conditions as before.34
Moreover, our general approach can potentially be extended to axiomatize other models
of non-linear habit formation. If the de¯nition of weaning is generalized so that compen-
sation may depend on the choice set, then the critical assumption generating linearity is
relaxed. One may then presumably generate other models of habit formation by placing the
appropriate axioms on compensation and modifying our techniques to obtain a discounted
utility representation on the relevant auxiliary space.
Finally, while this paper has addressed riskless choice, our approach can be immedi-
ately generalized to expected utility by imposing the von Neumann-Morganstern axioms
on lotteries and our axioms on the degenerate lotteries. The prototypical example used to
illustrate the failings of expected discounted utility is that DM would be indi®erent between
a lottery that o®ers a :5-probability of (100;100;:::) and a :5-probability of (0;0;:::), and
another lottery that o®ers a :5-probability of getting each 0 or 100, independently in every
period. Under expected linear habit formation, the DM is not indi®erent between these
lotteries because they a®ect her consumption path; she cares about the correlation in the
lottery because she is maximizing the expectation of a time-nonseparable utility. Models of
habit formation with expected utility o®er some separation between risk aversion and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, thereby avoiding an important pitfall of expected
discounted utility.35
34Such a model is proposed by Kozicki & Tinsley (2002) and is particularly appealing in light of Wendner
(2003), which shows the counterintuitive implications of a common model in which the argument of the
felicity is current consumption divided by a linear habit stock.
35For example, see Constantinides (1990) or Boldrin, Christiano & Fisher (1997).
35Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3.3
Let the preference _ º be continuous in the product topology. If _ º respects gains-domination
then it clearly satis¯es GM*. To show the converse, suppose that c gains-dominates c0 and
that the preference satis¯es GM*. By rearranging the inequality in the de¯nition of gains-
domination, we see that ct ¡ c0
t ¸ ct¡1 ¡ c0
t¡1 for every t ¸ 1; i.e., the gap between c and
c0 is widening (since c ¸ c0). Let t1 = minft : ct > c0
tg and ®1 = ct1 ¡ c0
t1. De¯ne c1 by
c1
t = c0
t + ®1 8 t ¸ t1 and c1
t = c0
t otherwise. Note that c1 _ Â c0 by gains-monotonicity*. For
n ¸ 2, inductively de¯ne tn = minft : ct > c
n¡1
t g. So long as tn < 1, let ®n = ctn ¡ c
n¡1
tn
and de¯ne cn by cn
t = c
n¡1
t + ®n 8 t ¸ tn and cn
t = cn¡1 8 t < tn. By GM*, cn _ º cn¡1 8
n ¸ 2 and so by transitivity, cn _ Â c1 _ Â c0. Note that gains-domination implies tn > tn¡1,
and by construction, cn
t = ct 8 t · tn. Hence limn!1 cn = c in the product topology.
Continuity of _ º in the product topology then guarantees the desired result c _ º c1 _ Â c0.
B Proof of su±ciency in Theorem 4.1
In this section of the Appendix we prove that the axioms PR, C, DC, GM, HC, and NDM
imply the desired representation. The axioms PR, C, DC, HC, GS and NDM are implicit
in all hypotheses, and we make it clear in the statement of the lemmas when GM is invoked
to clarify why Corollary 4.2 follows.
Results about the sequences dh0;h
Here we establish that each dh0;h may be written as an in¯nite sum of independent one-step
transitions, and begin proving that each such summand will satisfy a particular functional
equation. Because we will ultimately show that dh0;h = d
~ 0;h¡h0, we save on notation by
using dh whenever d
~ 0;h is intended.
Lemma B.1. For each h0 there is no nonzero ¹ c 2 C such that c + ¹ c ºh0 c0 + ¹ c i® c ºh0 c0
for all c;c0 2 C. Consequently we may de¯ne dh;h = (0;0;:::).
36Proof. If there were, then for any h ¸ h0 both ¹ c+dh0;h and dh0;h would compensate from h0
to h, violating uniqueness.
The next lemma provides a useful \triangle equality."
Lemma B.2. (The Triangle Equality) Let h00 ¸ h0 ¸ h. Then dh;h00 = dh;h0 + dh0;h00.
Proof. By application of Weaning, c ºh c0 i® c + dh;h0 ºh0 c0 + dh;h0. Using Weaning again,
c + dh;h0 ºh0 c0 + dh;h0 i® c + dh;h0 + dh0;h00 ºh00 c0 + dh;h0 + dh0;h00. Therefore, c ºh c0 i®
c + dh;h0 + dh0;h00 ºh00 c0 + dh;h0 + dh0;h00 for arbitrary c;c0 2 C and so dh;h0 + dh0;h00 plays the
role of dh;h00.36 The result follows by uniqueness of dh;h00.
The following connects compensating for one memory and for an entire habit.
Lemma B.3. Let h0 = h0 and for every k inductively de¯ne hk by hk




for all i 6= k. Then, for any (h0;h) 2 H, dh0;h =
P1
k=1 dhk¡1;hk. Moreover, dhk¡1;hk depends
only on the tuple (k;h0
k;hk).
Remark B.4. Lemma B.3 implies that we may write dk;h0
k;hk instead of dhk¡1;hk, since the
compensation is independent of the values of h0 and h on Nnfkg. Indeed, dk;q0;q will denote
any transition between any two habit vectors in which only the k-th element is changed from
q0 to q. We also de¯ne one other piece of notation: for any h 2 H, q 2 Q and k 2 N, the
habit hk;q 2 H is de¯ned by h
k;q
k = q and h
k;q
t = ht for every t 6= k.
Proof. We prove the lemma in three steps: (1) for any (h0;h) 2 H, we may write dh0;h =
P1
k=1 dhk¡1;hk +limK!1 dhK;h, where the ¯nal term is (0;0;:::) if h0;h are eventually iden-
tical; (2) each dhk¡1;hk is independent of the values of h0 and h on N n fkg; and (3)
limK!1 dhK;h = (0;0;:::).
(i) Using iterated application of the triangle equality from Lemma B.2, observe that for
habits (h0;h) 2 H that eventually agree (WLOG, suppose they agree on ft;t+1;:::g)
we have dh0;h =
Pt
k=1 dhk¡1;hk. Now consider arbitrary (h0;h) 2 H. For any K 2 N
and any c;c0 2 C, c ºh0 c0 i® c +
PK
k=1 dhk¡1;hk ºhK c0 +
PK
k=1 dhk¡1;hk. But again by
Weaning in Axiom HC, c+
PK
k=1 dhk¡1;hk ºhK c0+
PK





k=1 dhk¡1;hk+dhK;h. Therefore, for arbitrary K, dh0;h =
PK
k=1 dhk¡1;hk+
dhK;h. Taking the limit over K, dh0;h =
P1
k=1 dhk¡1;hk + limK!1 dhK;h.






ºh0 c0 + dh;h
0










, it su±ces that the equivalence hold.
37(ii) We now show that each dhk¡1;hk is independent of the values of h0 and h on N n fkg.













To see this, use Lemma B.2 to write dhk;q0




;¹ hk;q as well as
dhk;q0
;¹ hk;q = dhk;q0
;hk;q

















;¹ hk;q holds by Axiom HC(iii).
Consider arbitrary h0 · h and k, and recall the de¯nition of hk. Since hk and hk+1
agree on Nnfkg, (17) implies that dhk;hk+1 = d
~ 0
k;h0
k;~ 0k;hk. Hence dhk¡1;hk depends only
on (k;h0
k;hk), as claimed.
(iii) Now we show that limK!1 dhK;h = (0;0;:::). Since the habits hK and h agree on
f1;2;:::;Kg, iterated application of Axiom HC(iii) implies that for each K, dhK;h =















where the last equality is due to Axiom NDM and dh0;h decreasing in h0.
Next we use dynamic consistency in conjunction with compensation.
Lemma B.5. For any q; ^ q 2 Q and k,
d





















equal to (q;0;0;:::;0). According to Weaning,
c º~ 0 c
0 i® c + d
~ 0k;^ q




38Applying DC to the RHS of (19),
c + d
~ 0k;^ q



















But again by DC, this time applied to the LHS of (19),






























k¡1). As kc and kc0
are arbitrary, kd
~ 0k;^ q = d






k¡1). In particular, the choice of c;c0 (which
depended on q) does not a®ect d
~ 0k;^ q. This means kd








giving the desired conclusion.










Proof. By Lemma B.5,
d














for any q; ^ q 2 Q. Using Lemma B.2,
d




































































39Setting equations (25) and (26) equal using (24) and canceling the parts corresponding to
(27) gives the desired result.
Construction of the habit aggregator
We now use the prior results to derive a sequence of functional equations and de¯ne the
habit aggregator ' : H ! R as an in¯nite sum of linear functions. We develop properties
of the aggregator, including geometric bounds on the habit formation coe±cients and a
recursive representation of compensation.
For each k de¯ne 'k : Q ! R by 'k(q) = d
~ 0k;q
0 if q > 0 and 'k(0) = 0. We naturally
















Consequently, each 'k(¢) is additive on its image, i.e., for every k,
'k('k(q) + q
0) = 'k('k(q)) + 'k(q
0) 8 q;q
0 2 Q: (29)



















0 by Lemma B.6. Then (29) follows by construction.
Remark B.8. Equation (29) is a complex functional equation, the solution of which has
not yet been completely characterized. A theorem of W. Jarczyk (proved in Jarczyk (1991,
pp. 52-61)) asserts that continuous solutions of (29) must be a±ne. Lemma B.11 examines
a weak technical condition which ensures continuity of 'k(¢). But ¯rst we show how Ax-
iom NDM reduces the functional equation (29) to a simple nonnegativity-restricted Cauchy
equation that can be solved.37
Lemma B.9. 'k(q) = ¸kq for some ¸k > 0 and 8 q 2 Q; and dh0;h = d
~ 0;h¡h0 for every
(h0;h) 2 H.
37A function f : R+ ! R+ satis¯es a non-negativity restricted Cauchy equation if for every x;y 2 R+,
f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y).
40Remark B.10. Since this lemma proves 'k is linear, we may reduce the number of argu-
ments of dh0;h and apply '(¢): i.e., '(h ¡ h0) = dh¡h0 = dh0;h.
Proof. By Axiom NDM and construction, 'k(¢) is onto Q. Hence (29) is identical to the non-
negativity restricted Cauchy equation under the reparametrization q00 = 'k(q0). We know
'k(¢) is strictly monotone; in combination with Axiom NDM, this implies continuity. Then
we know from Aczel & Dhombres (1989, Corollary 9) that 'k is a strictly increasing and
a±ne function. To see the second result, note for each q0;q 2 Q and k, dk;q0;q = dk;0;q¡dk;0;q0.
But 'k(q) = dk;0;q is linear, so dk;q0;q = dk;0;q¡q0. The result follows immediately from the
additive characterization of dh0;h.
We now consider an alternative condition forcing continuity of dk;0;q given that it satis¯es
the functional equation (29). The condition says that the set






has Lebesgue measure zero for every q > 0 and fqng 2 Q with limn!1 qn = q. We call this
condition (¤). It di®ers from the condition that dk;";q is almost everywhere continuous in q
for any ¯xed ", which is implied by monotonicity in q.
Lemma B.11. Suppose condition (¤) is satis¯ed. Let the sequence fqngn2N be in Q
and let limn!1 qn = q. Then, for any k, limn!1 dk;0;qn = dk;0;q for every q > 0 and
limn!1 dk;0;qn = (0;0;:::) for q = 0.
Proof. The triangle equality in Lemma B.2 shows that dh0;h is monotonic in each argument
and therefore almost everywhere continuous in each. We wish to rule out discontinuities
on a set of measure zero. Consider some q > 0. We prove that if f^ qng 2 Q is s.t.
limn!1 ^ qn = ^ q where 0 < ^ q < q, then limn!1 dk;^ qn;q = dk;^ q;q, since dk;^ qn;q = dk;0;q ¡ dk;0;^ qn.
Suppose instead that limn!1 dk;^ qn;q 6= dk;^ q;q and choose ¹ q > q. Then dk;^ qn;¹ q = dk;^ qn;q + dq;¹ q
implies limn!1 dk;^ qn;¹ q 6= dk;^ q;¹ q for every ¹ q > q. Take f¹ qng with ¹ qn · ¹ q and limn!1 ¹ qn =
¹ q. For some such ¹ q, large n, and " < ^ q, dk;^ qn;¹ q = dk;^ qn;¹ qn + d¹ qn;¹ q so limn!1 dk;^ qn;¹ q =
limn!1 dk;^ qn;¹ qn = limn!1 dk;";¹ qn ¡ limn!1 dk;";^ qn. By limn!1 dk;^ qn;¹ q 6= dk;^ q;¹ q = dk;";¹ q ¡ dk;";^ q
then limn!1 dk;";¹ qn 6= dk;";¹ q. This is so for a set of "'s of nonzero measure, violating condition
(¤). Hence limn!1 dk;0;qn = dk;0;q if q > 0. Now consider the case ^ q = 0 and limn!1 ^ qn = ^ q.
Suppose by contradiction that lim~ q!0 d
k;0;~ q
0 = " > 0 (if " = 0 then the stream is identically


















Since " > 0, take q ! 0 on both sides, giving limq!0 d
k;0;q
0 = 0 < ". This contradicts the
de¯nition of ".
The following lemma develops a recursive representation of compensation.
Lemma B.12. For any t ¸ 0 and h 2 H, tdh = dhdh
0dh
1¢¢¢dh






Proof. By strong induction. Clearly the lemma is true for t = 0: dh = dh. Assume it
is true for every t smaller than some ^ t that tdh = dhdh
0dh
1¢¢¢dh






^ t¡1. By the inductive hypothesis, and using hdh
0dh
1 ¢¢¢dh















Once more by the inductive hypothesis, dh











^ t as desired.
Lemma B.12 implies dh
1 = '(h'(h)), dh
2 = '(h'(h)'(h'(h))), etc. We also use this
lemma to prove the geometric decay of the ¸'s.
Lemma B.13. Every dk;q;q0 is decreasing if and only if ¸1 2 (0;1) and
¸k+1
¸k
· 1 ¡ ¸1 8 k ¸ 1: (30)
We remark that (30) clearly implies that
P1
k=1 ¸k · 1. Note that the geometric bounds
are found from each dk;q;q0 and do not require the ¯rst part of Axiom NDM.
Proof. Lemmas B.3, B.9 and B.12 together prove that each d
k;q0;q
t may be written
d
k;q0;q























i ¸t¡i ¡ ¸t+k(q ¡ q
0): (32)
42When t = 1, only the term (¸k ¡ ¸k¸1 ¡ ¸k+1)(q ¡ q0) remains in (32) for each k. Hence,




1 for every k. Note that this also has
the e®ect of implying ¸1 < 1, since ¸k > 0 for every k by Lemma B.9. Now, we show that




t for every t. Indeed, rearranging (32) and plugging in










i [¸t¡i¡1 ¡ ¸t¡i] + (q ¡ q








i [¸t¡i¡1(1 ¡ ¸1) ¡ ¸t¡i] + (q ¡ q
0)[¸t¡1+k(1 ¡ ¸1) ¡ ¸t+k]
¸ 0;
where the nonnegativity follows from condition (30).











strict inequality holding for the upper bound if there exists k such that
¸k+1
¸k < 1 ¡ ¸1 and
hk 6= 0.





We next demonstrate that the compensating sequences are either constant or tend to





k=1 ¸k < 1, respectively.




t¡1 < 1 if
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1. In particular, if for some
" > 0 there is k¤ such that
¸k¤+1





· 1 ¡ "¸k¤. Consequently,
if
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1 then for any h,
P1
t=1 dh
t < 1 and limt!1 dh
t = 0.
Proof. Let " = 1 ¡ ¸1 ¡
¸k¤+1





t¡1¡k¤ if t > k¤
hk¤+1¡t if t · k¤ Using the recursive

























43with equality if k¤ is the unique k such that
¸k+1
¸k < 1 ¡ ¸1. Because we know that
dh
t¡1¡k¤ ¸ dh

















¸k¤ + ¸1 · 1 ¡ "¸k¤:
Finally, the compensating streams are constant when
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1, as claimed.
Lemma B.16. If
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1 (i.e.,
¸i+1
¸i = 1 ¡ ¸1 8 i), then every compensating stream
dh0;h is constant.
Proof. It is easily checked for this case that given any h 2 H and q 2 Q, we have '(hq) =
(1 ¡ ¸1)'(h) + ¸1q. Therefore '(h'(h)) = '(h). The claim easily follows from induction
and the recursive characterization in Lemma B.12.
Construction of the continuous preference relation º¤
In this subsection we show that Axiom HC permits the construction of a continuous map
g from H £ C into an auxiliary space C¤. We also develops critical properties of g that
allow us to construct a well-de¯ned continuous preference relation on C¤ which preserves
the original preference.
We endow the space £1
i=0R with the product topology and de¯ne the transformation
g : H £ C ! £1
i=0R by g(h;c) = (c0 ¡ '(h);c1 ¡ '(hc0);c2 ¡ '(hc0c1);:::). Let C¤ =
g(H £ C) and C¤
h = g(fhg £ C), for any h 2 H, be the image and projected image under
g, respectively. We shall consider C¤ to be a metric subspace of £1
t=0R, implying that C¤
is a metric space in its own right. As a reminder, the spaces H and C are metrized by the
sup metric ½H(h;h0) = supk jhk ¡ h0









respectively. We will naturally metrize H£C by ½H£C((h;c);(h0;c0)) = ½H(h;h0)+½C(c;c0).
Using these metrics it is not di±cult to see, as the ensuing lemma asserts, that g(¢;¢)
is jointly continuous in all arguments and that once one ¯xes an h 2 H the map g(h;¢) :
C ! C¤
h is a homeomorphism (that is, it is continuous and also has a continuous inverse).
The continuity in h is a direct consequence of the use of the sup metric on the space H
and would fail if the product metric were used instead.38
38To see this, we can show that '(¢) is discontinuous at ~ 0 under the product metric. Take any " > 0 and
44Lemma B.17. g(¢;¢) is a continuous mapping; moreover, for any given h 2 H, g(h;¢) is
a homeomorphism into C¤
h.
Proof. The map is continuous in the topology if every component is. Linearity of ' implies
that the t-th component can be written as ct ¡'(h0t)¡
Pt
k=1 ¸kct¡k; as only there is only
a ¯nite sum of elements of c in each component, the map is continuous with respect to C.
Using the sup metric it is clear that '(¢) is continuous with respect to H. The desired joint
continuity is evident under the respective metrics. Finally, for any h 2 H we can directly
exhibit the inverse g¡1(h;¢) : C¤



























h for any (h0;h) 2 H.
Proof. To show that the C¤
h are an increasing sequence, take (c0 ¡ '(h0);c1 ¡ '(h0c0);c2 ¡
'(h0c0c1);:::) 2 C¤
h0, so that (c0;c1;c2;:::) 2 C. Consider any (h0;h) 2 H. It is clear that
c + dh0;h 2 C. By Lemma B.12 we know that dh0;h = dh¡h0 = ('(h ¡ h0);'(h ¡ h0;'(h0 ¡
h));:::). Moreover, ' is a±ne by Lemma B.9. Using the additivity of ',
(c0+'(h ¡ h
0) ¡ '(h);c1 + '(h ¡ h
0;'(h ¡ h
0)) ¡ '(h;c0 + '(h ¡ h
0));:::)
= (c0 + '(h ¡ h
0 ¡ h);c1 + '(h ¡ h
0 ¡ h;'(h ¡ h
0) ¡ c0 ¡ '(h ¡ h
0));:::)






We would like to know that C¤ is separable, connected and convex. Since H and C are
each connected, so is H £C; so C¤ is certainly connected, being the continuous image of a
connected space. We cannot directly use the well-known result that the continuous image




0 k 6= j
"
¸j k = j . Each hj 2 H since it is bounded, and hj satis¯es '(hj) = " > 0.
Yet hj goes to ~ 0 in the product metric.
45of a separable space is separable, since H is not separable under the sup metric; and if we
were to make H separable by endowing it with the product topology instead, then g would
not be continuous with respect to h.
Lemma B.19. C¤ is separable, connected and convex.
Proof. We have already shown connectedness. To see separability, construct the sequence
fhngn2Z by hn = (:::;n;n;n). By Lemma B.18, C¤ =
S
n2Z C¤
hn. Since each g(hn;¢) is
continuous, each C¤
hn is the continuous image of a separable space and therefore separable.
Letting ~ C¤




hn as a countable
dense subset of C¤. Finally, to see that C¤ is convex, note that the transformation g(¢;¢) is
linear and that C and H are convex.
We de¯ne a binary relation º¤ on C¤ £ C¤ by
g(h;c) º
¤ g(h; _ c) i® c ºh _ c: (34)
Lemma B.20. The relation º¤ is well-de¯ned.
Proof. To see that º¤ is well-de¯ned, note that we may alternatively write (34) as c¤ º¤ _ c¤







0 + '(h));:::) ºh (_ c
¤
0 + '(h); _ c
¤
1 + '(h; _ c
¤
0 + '(h));:::) (35)
for some h 2 H such that c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤
h. Suppose by contradiction that for some h0 6= h such





















Take any ¹ h ¸ h;h0. Since the C¤
^ h are nested by Lemma B.18, c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤
¹ h. By application
of Weaning to the RHS of (35) and Lemma B.12,
(c
¤




0 + '(h)) + '(¹ h ¡ h;'(¹ h ¡ h));:::) º¹ h
(_ c
¤
0 + '(h) + '(¹ h ¡ h); _ c
¤
1 + '(h; _ c
¤
0 + '(h)) + '(¹ h ¡ h;'(¹ h ¡ h));:::):
(37)
46Using the a±ne nature of ', (37) is equivalent to
(c
¤
0 + '(¹ h);c
¤
1 + '(¹ h;c
¤
0 + '(¹ h));:::) º¹ h (_ c
¤
0 + '(¹ h); _ c
¤
1 + '(¹ h; _ c
¤
0 + '(¹ h));:::): (38)
Similarly, by applying Weaning to (36) we see that (36) holds if and only if
(_ c
¤
0 + '(¹ h); _ c
¤
1 + '(¹ h; _ c
¤
0 + '(¹ h));:::) Â¹ h (c
¤
0 + '(¹ h);c
¤
1 + '(¹ h;c
¤
0 + '(¹ h));:::);
contradicting (38). Therefore º¤ is well-de¯ned.
Now that º¤ is well-de¯ned, we show that it is a continuous preference relation.
Lemma B.21. º¤ is a continuous preference relation.
Proof. The C¤
h0 are nested by Lemma B.18. Thus for any c¤; _ c¤;^ c¤ 2 C¤, there is h 2 H
large enough so that c¤; _ c¤;^ c¤ 2 C¤
h. Hence º¤ inherits completeness and transitivity over
fc¤; _ c¤;^ c¤g from ºh. As c¤; _ c¤;^ c¤ 2 C¤ were arbitrary, º¤ is a preference relation.
To prove that º¤ is continuous in the product topology, we will show that the weak
upper contour sets are closed; the argument for the weak lower contour sets is identical.
Consider any sequence of streams fc¤ngn2Z 2 C¤ converging to some c¤ 2 C¤ and suppose
that there is some ^ c¤ 2 C¤ such that c¤n º¤ ^ c¤ for all n. Take any h and c such that
g(h;c) = c¤. By Lemma B.17, g is continuous: for any "-ball Y ½ C¤ around c¤ there is a
±-ball X ½ H£C around (h;c) such that g(X) ½ Y . Because the sequence fc¤ng converges
to c¤ there is a subsequence fc¤mg 2 Y also converging to c¤. By our use of the sup metric
on H we know that any (h0;c0) 2 X must satisfy h0 · h + (±;±;:::). Then Lemma B.18
ensures that for every m, c¤m 2 C¤
h+(:::;±;±). Take ¹ h ¸ h + (:::;±;±) and large enough that
^ c¤ 2 C¤
¹ h. This permits us to compare all of the corresponding streams in C under º¹ h.
Indeed, using g¡1(¹ h;¢) as de¯ned in (33), take ¹ cm = g¡1(¹ h;c¤m) for each m, ¹ c = g¡1(¹ h;c¤),
and ^ ¹ c = g¡1(¹ h;^ c¤). Using the hypothesis and the de¯nition of º¤ we know that ¹ cm º¹ h ^ ¹ c for
every m. Lemma B.17 asserts that g¡1(¹ h;¢) is continuous, so ¹ cm converges to ¹ c. Since º¹ h is
continuous by Axiom C, we know ¹ c º¹ h ^ ¹ c. This proves the desired result that c¤ º¤ ^ c¤.
Because º¤ is a continuous preference relation and C¤ is separable, we note for future
reference that the argument for Proposition 3.1 shows that º¤ has a continuous represen-
tation U¤ : C¤ ! R.
47We now show that º¤ exhibits strict preference over some pair of streams that di®er
only by a single element. The proof relies on Gains Sensitivity.
Lemma B.22. There exist q¤; ^ q¤ 2 R, c¤ 2 C¤, and t 2 N such that (c¤t¡1;q¤; t+1c¤) Â¤
(c¤t¡1; ^ q¤; t+1c¤).
Proof. Let ® > 0, h 2 H, and c 2 C be such that c + ® 6»h c. We make the following
observation: since the compensating streams are (weakly) decreasing and for each ® > 0,
d
~ 0®
0 < ®, we can write any positive constant stream as a staggered sum of streams of the
form (®;d
~ 0®). Formally, for any ® > 0 we can ¯nd a sequence of times t1 < t2 < ¢¢¢ and
positive numbers ® > ®1 > ®2 > ¢¢¢ such that the stream (®;®;:::) can be written as
the consumption stream created by (®;d
~ 0®) starting at time 0, plus the stream (®1;d
~ 0®1)
starting at time t1, plus the stream (®2;d
~ 0®2) starting at time t2, etc. Now, let us suppose
by contradiction that 8 q¤; ^ q¤ 2 R, c¤ 2 C¤, and t 2 N, (c¤t¡1;q¤; t+1c¤) »¤ (c¤t¡1; ^ q¤; t+1c¤).
Let g(h;c) = c¤ where h;c are given as initally stated. Then (c¤t¡1;c¤
t + ®; t+1c¤) »¤ c¤ by
hypothesis. By de¯nition, this means that g¡1(h;(c¤t¡1;c¤
t + ®; t+1c¤)) »h g¡1(h;(c¤)), or
(ct¡1;ct + ®; t+1c + d
~ 0®) »h c. In light of our initial observation, iterative application of
the indi®erence for ®1;®2;::: and product continuity, this implies that c + (®;®;:::) »h c,
violating Gains Sensitivity.
Separability conditions for º¤
We now prove a stronger version of stationarity than given in Koopmans (1960).
Lemma B.23. For any c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤ with c¤
0 = _ c¤
0, (c¤
0; 1c¤) º¤ (c¤
0; 1_ c¤) i® 1c¤ º¤ 1_ c¤.
Proof. To see this, note that (c¤
0; 1c¤) º¤ (c¤







0 + '(h));:::) ºh (c
¤




0 + '(h));:::) (39)
for some h 2 H such that c¤; _ c¤ 2 C¤
h. Since c¤ 2 C¤
h, c¤
0 + '(h) 2 Q. Because ºh satis¯es




































48This means by de¯nition that 1c¤ º¤ 1_ c¤.
We now prove that Compensated Separability su±ces for the required additive separa-
bility conditions to hold; we must show that a certain mapping from C into C¤ is surjective,
so that the needed conditions apply for all elements of C¤.
Recall Lemma B.18, which showed that the C¤
h0 are nested. In this case we need an
orthogonal result, that even though ^ h0t+1 6¸ hct it is possible that ^ h is su±ciently large to
ensure that C¤
hct µ C¤
^ h0t+1 (we remind the reader that ct 2 Qt+1).













We will now show that we can ¯nd ^ c 2 C such that the claim of the lemma is true. Indeed,
choose any c¤ 2 C¤
hct. Then, there is a _ c 2 C such that g(hct; _ c) = c¤. For it to also be true
that c¤ 2 C¤
^ h0t+1 it must be that for some ^ c 2 C,




s = _ cs ¡ '(hc
t_ c
s¡1) 8s ¸ 0; (41)
where c¡1; _ c¡1 are ignored for the case s = 0. We claim that we can construct ^ c by using
(41) to recursively de¯ne ^ cs = '(^ h0t+1^ cs¡1) + _ cs ¡ '(hct_ cs¡1) for every s ¸ 0.
We need only show that ^ c 2 C to complete the proof. To do this we must show two
things: ¯rst, that ^ c is nonnegative, and second, that ^ c remains bounded.
(i) ^ c is nonnegative: it will su±ce to show that ^ c ¸ _ c. For s = 0 it is clearly true that
^ c0 ¸ _ c0, since we have chosen '(^ h0t+1) ¡ '(hct) ¸ 0 in (40). We will proceed by
strong induction, assuming that ^ c^ s¡1 ¸ _ c^ s¡1 for every ^ s · s for some s. From (41),
to prove that ^ cs ¸ _ cs it must be shown that '(^ h0t+1^ cs¡1) ¡ '(hct_ cs¡1) ¸ 0. In fact,








(^ h ¡ h)0
t+s+1¢
+ '












































where the ¯rst inequality comes from the nonnegativity of '; the equality comes from
plugging in for ^ c0¡ _ c0 from (41); the second inequality comes from (40) and the linear
representation for ' in Lemma B.9; and the last inequality comes from the result in
Lemma B.13 that
¸s+1+i
¸s · (1 ¡ ¸1)i+1.
(ii) ^ c remains bounded: since _ c 2 C it is bounded, so it will su±ce to show that the





¡~ 0(^ c0 ¡ _ c0)0
¢
. By construction, for every s ¸ 1, ^ cs ¡ _ cs is equal to the
sum on the RHS of the ¯rst equality in (42). By the fading nature of compensation,
all terms but '
¡~ 0(^ c1 ¡ _ c1)¢¢¢(^ cs ¡ _ cs)
¢
converge to 0 as s tends to in¯nity. In fact,





¡~ 0(^ c0¡_ c0)0s¡1¢
is no bigger than (1¡¸1)s¡1y for any s. Let us drop
the negative term ¡'(~ 0ct0s) in (42) to obtain an upper bound. By the de¯nition of y,
we see that ^ c1¡_ c1 · y. We claim that for all s ¸ 1, ^ cs¡_ cs · y. The proof proceeds by





k=1 ¸s · ¸1
Ps¡2
k=0(1 ¡ ¸1)k = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸1)s¡1, so we see that ^ cs ¡ _ cs · y as
claimed.
This completes the proof of the lemma.










We will wish to show that each »t can \hit" every c¤ 2 C¤ with the appropriate choices of
h and c; namely,
Lemma B.25. Each »t is surjective.
Proof. Fix any c¤ 2 C¤ and t ¸ 1. By de¯nition, we already know that there is some h 2 H
and c 2 C such that g(h;c) = c¤. That is, for every s, cs ¡ '(hc0c1 :::cs¡1) = c¤
s. Let us
¯x this h and c.
We wish to show that there exist ^ h 2 H and ^ c 2 C such that »t(^ h;^ c) = c¤, i.e.
( ^ c0¡'(^ h);^ c1¡'(^ h^ c0);:::;^ ct¡1¡'(^ h^ c0 :::^ ct¡2);^ ct¡'(^ h0
t);^ ct+1¡'(^ h0
t^ ct);::: ) = c
¤: (44)
Because c¤ 2 C¤
h, tc¤ 2 C¤
hct¡1. Equation (44) suggests that we must show that tc¤ 2 C¤
^ h0t
for some ^ h 2 H. This is accomplished by Lemma B.24, which provides a ¹ c and ^ h > h
s.t. g(^ h0t;¹ c) = tc¤. Moreover, since ^ h > h, c¤ 2 C¤
^ h. Therefore, there exists ¹ ¹ c 2 C such
that g(^ h;¹ ¹ c) = c¤ and in particular, g(^ h;¹ ¹ c)t¡1 = c¤t¡1. Setting ^ c = (¹ ¹ ct¡1; t¹ c), we have
»t(^ h;^ c) = c¤.
We shall now demonstrate that additive separability is satis¯ed.
Lemma B.26. º¤ satis¯es the following separability conditions:
(i) Take any c¤;^ c¤ 2 C¤ with c¤
0 = ^ c¤
0. Then, for any ¹ c¤
0 s.t. (¹ c¤
0; 1c¤);(¹ c¤
































Proof. The proof of condition (i) follows directly from stationarity of º¤, proved in Lemma
B.23. The remainder of the proof deals with condition (ii).
51Find h large enough so that (c¤t;¹ c¤), (^ c¤t;¹ c¤), (c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤), (^ c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤) 2 C¤
h. Hence, there exist
~ c;~ ~ c; _ c;Ä c such that g(h;~ c) = (c¤t;¹ c¤), g(h;~ ~ c) = (^ c¤t;¹ c¤), g(h; _ c) = (c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤), and g(h;Ä c) =
(^ c¤t;¹ ¹ c¤). Moreover, we must have ~ ct = _ ct and ~ ~ ct = Ä ct.
By Lemma B.25, »t is surjective. We claim that there are ^ h and c;^ c;¹ c;¹ ¹ c 2 C so that
»t(^ h;(c
t;¹ c)) = (c
¤t;¹ c
¤); »t(^ h;(^ c




t;¹ ¹ c)) = (c
¤t;¹ ¹ c
¤); »t(^ h;(^ c



















Now that we have an ^ h that will work uniformly for these four streams in C¤, note again
from the construction in Lemma B.24 that the required continuation streams depend only
on ~ ct = _ ct and ~ ~ ct = Ä ct. Therefore, ¹ c and ¹ ¹ c may be constructed as desired in (47). From
the construction at the end of Lemma B.25 and the fact that ^ h has been chosen to work
uniformly, c and ^ c may be chosen to satisfy (47).
Consequently, using (47), the desired result (46) holds if and only if
»t(^ h;(c
t;¹ c)) º
¤ »t(^ h;(^ c
t;¹ c)) i® »t(^ h;(c
t;¹ ¹ c)) º
¤ »t(^ h;(^ c
t;¹ ¹ c));
which, using the de¯nitions of »t in (43) and º¤, holds if and only if
(c
t¡1;¹ c + d
h0t;hct¡1
) º^ h (^ c
t¡1;¹ c + d
h0t;h^ ct¡1
) if and only if
(c
t¡1;¹ ¹ c + d
h0t;hct¡1
) º^ h (^ c
t¡1;¹ ¹ c + d
h0t;h^ ct¡1
):
But this is immediately true by Compensated Separability.
For each subset of indices K ½ N, we will de¯ne the projection correspondences ¶K :
C¤ Ã £i2KR by ¶K( ^ C¤) = fx £i2K R j 9 c¤ 2 ^ C¤ s.t. c¤jK = x g, where c¤jK denotes the
restriction of the stream c¤ to the indices in K (e.g., c¤jf3;4g = (c¤
3;c¤
4)). For any t ¸ 0 we
will use C¤
t and tC¤ to denote the projected spaces ¶ftg(C¤) and ¶ft;t+1;:::g(C¤), respectively.
Since g(¢;¢) is continuous the projected image C¤
t is connected for every t. Moreover each
52C¤
t is separable. It is evident by the arbitrariness of histories used to construct these spaces
that for any t, tC¤ = C¤.
Lemma B.27. Choose some t and ^ c¤ 2 tC¤, and take c¤
s 2 C¤




t;^ c¤) 2 C¤.
Proof. Pick ^ h 2 H and ^ c 2 C such that ^ c¤ 2 C¤
^ h^ ct, and let ~ c¤t = g(^ h;^ c)jf0;1;:::;tg. Choose




k=i+1 ¸kg and set h = ^ h + (:::;";"). Recall the inverse func-
tion g¡1(h;¢), which takes an element of C¤ and returns an element of C. We do not
yet know that (c¤
0;c¤
1;:::;c¤
t;^ c¤) 2 C¤, but we demonstrate that applying the transfor-
mation used in g¡1(h;¢) to (c¤
0;c¤
1;:::;c¤




t;^ c¤))jf0;1;:::;tg. Since the C¤
h0 are nested and h ¸ ^ h, it will su±ce
to prove that ct ¸ ^ ct, for then ^ c¤ 2 C¤




t;^ c¤). Using the transformation, ct ¸ ^ ct if and only if c¤
0 + '(h) ¸ ~ c¤
0 + '(^ h),
c¤
1 + '(hc0) ¸ ~ c¤
1 + '(^ h^ c0), up through c¤
t + '(hc0 :::ct¡1) ¸ ~ c¤
t + '(^ h^ c0 :::^ ct¡1). But this
can be seen through forward induction by using the choice of ", de¯nition of h, and the
fact that ' is linear and increasing in each component.
The previous discussion has proved that C¤ = C¤
1 £ C¤
2 £ C¤
3 £ C¤ and that º¤ is
continuous and sensitive (stationarity then implies essentiality of all periods). Hence C¤ is
a product of separable and connected topological spaces. Suppose we could also show that














































































































































Then, for the case n = 4, we would be able to apply Debreu's well-known theorem on
additive separability for n ¸ 3 (see Fishburn (1970, Theorem 5.5) to conclude that there
exist u0;u1;u2 : R ! R and U3 : C¤ ! R (all continuous and unique up to a similar
positive linear transformation) such that c¤ º¤ ^ c¤ i® u0(c¤
0) + u1(c¤
1) + u2(c¤
2) + U3(3c¤) ¸
u0(^ c¤
0) + u1(^ c¤
1) + u2(^ c¤
2) + U3(3^ c¤).
Instead of (48), Lemma B.26 proves the statement (46). We now utilize the result of
53Gorman (1968, Theorem 1), which requires that each of C¤
1;C¤
2;C¤
3 and C¤ be arc-connected
and separable. We have already shown separability; and arc-connectedness follows from
being a path-connected Hausdor® space (a convex space is path-connected, and a metric
space is Hausdor®). Then, Gorman's Theorem 1 asserts that the set of separable indices
is closed under unions, intersections, and di®erences. Condition (46) implies separabil-
ity of f(1);(2)g and stationarity implies separability of f(2;3;4;:::)g and f(3;4;5;:::)g.39
Iterated application of Gorman's theorem implies (48).
ºh can be represented as in (1)
We have shown that º¤ satis¯es axioms similar to those of Koopmans (1960). To prove
º satis¯es (1) we ¯rst obtain an discounted utility representation for º¤ using a related
approach and then use the appropriate transformation.





k) (where ht is the evolving habit vector)
for some continuous u and ± 2 (0;1), with the given restrictions on f¸kg.
Proof. º¤ is a continuous, stationary, and sensitive preference relation; and satis¯es (48),




2 £C¤, with the additive components continuous and unique up to a similar positive
a±ne transformation. Condition (48) clearly also implies additive representability on C¤ =
C¤
0 £ C¤
1 £ C¤, with the additive components again unique up to a similar positive linear
transformation. By stationarity, u0(¢) + u1(¢) + [u2(¢) + U3(¢)] and u1(¢) + u2(¢) + U3(¢) are
both additive representations on C¤ = C¤
0 £ C¤
1 £ C¤. Thus, 9 ± > 0 and ¯1;¯2;¯3 2 R
s.t. u1(¢) = ±u0(¢) + ¯1, u2(¢) = ±u1(¢) + ¯2 = ±2u0(¢) + ±¯1 + ¯2, and for any c¤ 2 C¤,
U3(c¤) = ±[u2(c¤
0) + U3(1c¤)] + ¯3 = ±3u0(c¤
0) + ±U3(1c¤) + ¯3 + ±¯2 + ±2¯1. Each c 2 C and
h 2 H is bounded and
P1
k=1 ¸k · 1, so for each c¤ 2 C¤ 9 ¹ x;x 2 R such that x · c¤
t · ¹ x 8 t.
By Tychono®'s theorem [x; ¹ x]1 is compact in £1
i=0R and therefore [x; ¹ x]1 \C¤ is compact
in C¤. Given x and ¹ x, continuity of u0(¢) and U3(¢) ensures they remain uniformly bounded




where u(¢) = u0(¢) is continuous and ± 2 (0;1) by product continuity. To represent ºh as
in (1) we then transform each c 2 C by g(h;¢) into an argument of U¤.
39Because (46) hold for all t it is an even stronger hypothesis than necessary; also, for any t, f(t;t+1;t+
2;:::)g is strictly sensitive by dynamic consistency.
54The felicity u is increasing
We have shown that º¤ is represented by U¤(c¤) =
P1
t=0 ±tu(c¤
t) for some continuous
u : R ! R and ± 2 (0;1); and that we may derive from this the desired representation (1)
for ºh. We now use Axiom GM to put more structure on u.
Lemma B.29. Under Axiom GM the felicity u is an increasing function.
Before proving this we will prove the following lemma.




Proof. For arbitrary h, de¯ne ch by ch
0 = x0 + '(h), ch








t¡1) for t > T. ' is strictly increasing, so we may













T ) is nonnegative, then so is T+1ch~ x;T. Moreover, the stream is ultimately
weakly decreasing. Therefore ch~ x;T 2 C.
We may now prove Lemma B.29.
Proof. Suppose that u is not increasing. Because u is a continuous function, there must
then exist some x 2 R and ® > 0 such that 8 ®0 2 (0;®], u(x + ®0) < u(x).
Let T be arbitrary for the moment. Note that by Lemma B.30 there is h0 such that
(x;x;:::;x;0;0;:::) 2 C¤
h0 (where x is repeated T +1 times). Again by Lemma B.30 there
is h00 such that (x + ®;x;x;:::;x;0;0;:::) 2 C¤
h00 (where x by itself is repeated T times).
Let h ¸ h0;h00, and recall that the C¤
^ h are nested. Using the representation for º¤ and the


















Since (x;x;:::;x;0;0;:::) 2 C¤
h, there is c 2 C with g(h;c) = (x;x;:::;x;0;0;:::). Clearly
c + ® 2 C, and by GM we know c + ® Âh c. Moreover, g(h;c + ®) is











































Combine the RHS of (49) and the LHS of (51); and rearrange by subtracting the RHS of





























which is strictly positive. Since each ¸k > 0 and
P1
k=1 ¸k · 1, we know that the value
®(1¡
Pt
k=1 ¸k) 2 [0;®) for every t, and is in fact strictly positive as t < 1. The assumption



























is small enough to bring about the contradiction
0 > 0 from (52). This is possible because Lemma B.30 permits us to ¯nd h large enough
so that the constructed streams are in C¤.
Finally, we prove the strict monotonicity of u(¢) on the relevant ranges.
Lemma B.31. Assume Axiom GM. If
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1 then u(¢) is strictly increasing on
(0;1); and if
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1 then there is a with 0 < a · 1 such that u(¢) is strictly
increasing either on (¡a;1) or on (¡1;a).
Proof. By Lemma B.29 we know that u(¢) is an increasing function. To prove it is strictly
increasing on the relevant ranges we will consider the two cases separately.
(i)
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1: First we will show that u(¢) is strictly increasing in some interval
around 0. To complete the proof, we will show that there cannot exist x > 0 > y
such that u(¢) does not increase strictly at both x and y. To see the ¯rst point, take
any q > 0 and let h = (:::;q;q) and c = (q;q;:::). Then g(h;c) = (0;0;:::) and for




























By monotonicity of u(¢) it must be that u(¢) increases strictly in a neighborhood of
0. For the second point, suppose by contradiction that there exist x > 0 > y such
that u(¢) does not increase strictly at both x and y. By continuity and monotonicity
of u(¢) there is ® > 0 such that u(¢) is constant on (x;x + ®) and on (y;y + ®).
Without loss of generality suppose that x;y are rational (else take some rational x;y
inside the interval). Since x;y are rational there exist m;n such that mx = ¡ny. Let
c¤ = (xm;yn;xm;yn;:::) (i.e., x is repeated m times, then y is repeated n times, etc).
Because the compensating streams are constant, we may use the characterization
(53) in Lemma B.32 to ¯nd h 2 H large enough so that there is c 2 C satisfying
g(h;c) = c¤. Observe by GM that c+ ®
2 Âh c, a contradiction to the assumption that
u(¢) is constant on (x;x + ®) and (y;y + ®).
(ii)
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1: Observe that in this case, for any q 2 Q, if we set h = (:::;q;q) and




k=1 ¸k];:::). As q is arbitrary,
we may conclude that for any x ¸ 0, (x;x;x;:::) 2 C¤. Suppose to the contrary
that u(¢) is not increasing from the right at x. Since u(¢) is continuous and weakly
increasing, this implies that there exists some ¯+ > 0 such that for every 0 < ¯ · ¯+,
u(x+¯) = u(x). Let c and h be such that g(h;c) = (x;x;x;:::). By GM, c+¯ Âh c,











However, since 0 < ¯ · ¯+ and
Pt
k=1 ¸k < 1, u
¡





every t ¸ 0. This is a contradiction.
The felicity u is not (quasi-)cyclic
Recall the de¯nitions of a cyclic and quasi-cyclic function. To complete the proof of su±-
ciency we demonstrate that u must satisfy the desired acyclicity properties.
Lemma B.32. u is not quasi-cyclic if
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1 and not cyclic if
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1.
To prove this, we ¯rst prove an auxiliary result. For technical convenience the following
57lemma allows an extension of the de¯nition of compensation to negative \histories;" hence
if ° < 0 then d(~ 0;°) = ¡d(~ 0;¡°).
Lemma B.33. Consider any sequence f°tgt2N and h 2 H. If ¹ c 2 £1
t=0R satis¯es ¹ ct =
'(h¹ ct¡1) + °t for every t then each ¹ ct may be alternatively written as








Proof. The lemma is clearly true for t = 0. Suppose that Equation (53) holds for every
t · T ¡ 1. Then
¹ cT = °T + '(h¹ c
T¡1)


































where the second-to-last equality follows from using the recursive characterization given in
Lemma B.12 and reversing the order of summation.
Proof. (Lemma B.32) The two cases are examined separately.
(i)
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1. Suppose that u is quasi-cyclic, so there exists °;¯ > 0 and ® 2 R such
that u(x+°) = ¯u(x)+® for every x 2 R. Apply Lemma B.33 with °t = ° for every
t and recall the summability of per-period compensation from Lemma B.15. These
results imply that ¹ c as de¯ned in Lemma B.33 remains bounded, i.e. ¹ c 2 C. Moreover
¹ c0 = °, so c is nonzero. We claim that this ¹ c is exactly the consumption stream ¹ c
ruled out in Lemma B.1, a contradiction. Indeed, by our additive representation






ct + ¹ ct ¡ '(hc











t + ¹ ct ¡ '(hc




58Consider the t-th term u
¡
ct + ¹ ct ¡ '(hct¡1) ¡ '(~ 0¹ ct¡1)
¢
. By construction of ¹ c, this




= ¯u(ct¡'(hct¡1))+®. Since ¯ > 0, it becomes
evident that c + ¹ c ºh c0 + ¹ c i® c ºh c0 for any c;c0 2 C.
(ii)
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1. Suppose that u is cyclic. Then there exists ° > 0 and ® 2 R such
that u(x + °) = u(x) + ® for every x 2 R. In this case, simply choose ¹ c0 = ° and
¹ ct = '(~ 0¹ ct¡1) for every t ¸ 1. Clearly ¹ c 2 C. It is easy to check that c + ¹ c ºh c0 + ¹ c
i® c ºh c0 for any c;c0 2 C, violating Lemma B.1.
C Proof of necessity in Theorem 4.1
The representation clearly implies Axioms PR, C, DC, and NDM. Given the constructive
proof of su±ciency, the necessity of HC may also be seen, except perhaps for the uniqueness
of compensation. It may also not be obvious why the felicity need not be strictly monotonic.
We resolve these matters here.
Why u need not be strictly increasing everywhere
Lemma C.1. Suppose that
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1. Then,
(i) For any ° > 0, there does not exist a stream c 2 C and history h 2 H such that
c ¸ (°;°;:::) and g(h;c) · (0;0;:::).
(ii) For any ° < 0, there does not exist a stream c 2 C and history h 2 H such that
g(h;c) · (°;°;:::).
Proof. To see (i), we ¯rst note that if g(h;c) · (0;0;:::) then c0 · '(h), c1 · '(hc0),
c2 · '(hc0c1), etc. But using the monotonicity of ' and substituting in recursively, we see
that c1 · '(h'(h)), c2 · '(h'(h)'(h'(h))), etc. Therefore, it su±ces to show that the
compensating streams ('(h);'(h'(h));'(h'(h)'(h'(h)));:::) tend to zero asymptotically.
But this was accomplished in Lemma B.15.
Similarly, to see (ii), note that if g(h;c) · (°;°;:::) then c0 · '(h)+°, c1 · '(hc0)+° ·
'(h'(h))+¸1°+°. But since ° < 0, we may drop the term ¸1° to obtain c1 · '(h'(h))+°.
In this manner, c2 · '(h'(h)'(h'(h))) + °, and so on. But the compensating streams
59('(h);'(h'(h));'(h'(h)'(h'(h)));:::) tend to zero asymptotically, and yet ° < 0 is ¯xed,
implying that c must eventually become negative, a contradiction.
When
P1
k=0 ¸k < 1, the fact that there does not exist a stream c 2 C and history h 2 H
such that c ¸ (°;°;:::) for some ° > 0 and g(h;c) · (0;0;:::) means that the argument of
the felicity in the representation cannot always be strictly negative when the consumption
stream is bounded from zero. Moreover, the fact that there is no stream c 2 C and history
h 2 H and ° < 0 such that g(h;c) · (°;°;:::) means that the argument of the felicity
in the representation cannot be bounded below zero. The former implies that we cannot
shift a stream down using GM to conclude the felicity is increasing in the negative range,
and the latter implies that there is no stream which we can shift up using GM to conclude
that felicity is increasing in the negative range. Unlike in the case
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1, shifting
up (down) a stream starting from point t using GM leaves residual increases (decreases)
in every the argument of the felicity starting from point t onward. Even though shifting a
stream down (up) using the GM axiom will cause a decrease (increase) in utility, it su±ces
that the felicity is sensitive on the nonnegative domain for the utility to be sensitive to
the GM induced shift due to Lemma C.1. To understand why it su±ces that for some
0 < a · 1, u(¢) is only strictly increasing either on (¡1;a) or (¡a;1) when
P1
k=0 ¸k = 1,
we may use Lemma B.33. By the characterization in (53), there cannot exist h and c such
that g(h;c) is always positive and bounded from zero, or always negative and bounded
from zero (the stream would grow unboundedly in the ¯rst case and violate nonnegativity
in the second).
On the uniqueness of compensation
Lemma C.2. Assume the representation holds. Then for every (h0;h) 2 H there is a
unique d 2 C satisfying c + d ºh c0 + d i® c ºh0 c0 for every c0;c 2 C.
Proof. Clearly dh0;h as constructed earlier satis¯es this; suppose that some d 2 C, d 6=













represent ºh0. Using the uniqueness of the additive representation, there exist ¯ > 0 and
















Let °t = dt ¡ '((h ¡ h0)dt¡1) for every t; we must show °t = 0 for all t.
Observe that for any x 2 R and any t we may ¯nd c 2 C such that ct ¡ '(h0ct¡1) = x.
Indeed, if x ¸ 0 choose cs = 0 for every s < t and ct = '(h00t) + x; if x < 0 choose
cs = 0 for every s < t ¡ 1, ct¡1 = x
¸1, and ct = '(h00t). Therefore, for any x and t,
u(x + °t) = ¯u(x) + ®t.
Suppose that
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1. Consider the ¯rst nonzero °t. If it is positive then u is
quasi-cyclic, a contradiction. If °t < 0, then rearranging and changing variables gives
u(x + j°tj) = 1
¯u(x) ¡ ®t
¯ . Hence u is quasi-cyclic, a contradiction.
Now consider the case
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1. If some °t = 0 then u(x)(1 ¡ ¯) = ®t for all x,
implying that ¯ = 1 and u is cyclic, a contradiction. Hence °t 6= 0 for every t. We aim
to show there exist t;^ t such that °t 6= °^ t. If instead °t = ° for every t, then we know
that ° > 0 as a consequence of Lemma C.1, which says that for any ° < 0, there does not
exist a stream c 2 C and history ^ h 2 H such that g(^ h;c) · (°;°;:::) (apply the lemma
with ^ h = h ¡ h0 and c = d). But if ° > 0, then dt = '((h ¡ h0)dt¡1) + ° cannot be in
C, a contradiction. To see this, ¯rst observe by Lemma B.16 that d
~ 0°
t¡1 = ¸1° > 0 when
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1; then apply Lemma B.33. Since d grows unboundedly it cannot be in C.
Therefore, we conclude that there exist nonzero °t 6= °^ t such that u(x+°t) = ¯u(x)+®t
and u(x+°^ t) = ¯u(x)+®^ t for all x. Plug x+°^ t into the ¯rst equation and x+°t into the
second. This implies that for all x,
¯u(x + °t) + ®^ t = u(x + °t + °^ t) = ¯u(x + °^ t) + ®t:
Suppose WLOG that °t > °^ t. By changing variables we see that for all x u(x+~ °) = u(x)+~ ®,
where ~ ° = °t ¡ °^ t and ~ ® =
®t¡®^ t
¯ . But then u is cyclic, a contradiction.
61D Proof of Theorem 6.1 and habit decay
Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. Note that the claim (11) is obvious when
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1, for then
¸k+1
¸k = 1 ¡ ¸1 for
every k and consequently '(hq) = (1 ¡ ¸1)'(h) + ¸1q.
For the particular h and c0;^ c0 2 Q from Axiom IE ¯nd the corresponding c1;^ c1. Ax-
ioms IE and DC together imply that ºhc0c1 and ºh^ c0^ c1 are equivalent preferences, both
additively representable as in (2) according to Theorem 4.1. By the uniqueness of additive
representations up to positive a±ne transformation, there exist a ½ > 0 and a ¾i for every
i ¸ 0 such that for each ¹ c 2 C,
u
¡
¹ c ¡ '(h00¹ c




¹ c ¡ '(h00¹ c
i¡1) ¡ ¸i+1^ c1 ¡ ¸i+2^ c0
¢
+ ¾i: (54)
For each i, let °i = ¸i+1c1 + ¸i+2c0 ¡ ¸i+1^ c1 ¡ ¸i+2^ c0.
If
P1
k=1 ¸k < 1, then °i = 0 for every i since u cannot be quasi-cyclic. But we also wish
to examine the case
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1. Therefore, we note that ½ = 1 must hold. Indeed, since
¸i+1
¸i · 1 ¡ ¸1 2 (0;1), both j¸i+1^ c1 + ¸i+2c0j and j¸i+1^ c1 + ¸i+2^ c0j tend to zero as i goes to
in¯nity. As we have previously noted, for any i and x 2 R we may ¯nd a ¹ c 2 C such that
x = ¹ c ¡ '(h00¹ ci¡1). Then, by (54) and continuity of u(¢), limi!1 ¾i = (1 ¡ ½)u
¡
x) for any
x 2 R. Since the RHS depends on x while the LHS does not, we must have ½ = 1. Since
u cannot be cyclic when
P1
k=1 ¸k = 1, we have °i = 0 for every i in that case too.













¸k¡1hk¡1 + ¸1q =
c1 ¡ ^ c1
^ c0 ¡ c0
'(h) + ¸1q:
Now de¯ne ® =
c1¡^ c1
^ c0¡c0 and ¯ = ¸1. Clearly ® + ¯ · 1 since
¸i+1
¸i · 1 ¡ ¸1.
Additional results on habit decay
To isolate habit decay, we examine how the compensating stream changes dh0;h if the DM
only begins to wean herself from her current habit h tomorrow. If she abstains today,
the DM can be weaned starting tomorrow using dh00;h0 (the assumption of abstention is







the period-t rate of habit decay; the lower it is, the faster
the DM's habit decays in period t. We would like to use this measure to compare DM's.
De¯nition D.1. For each (h0;h) 2 H, let d
h0;h
i: denote the compensating streams of DMi
and d
h0;h















for every t and h ¸ h0 2 H. We express this relation by
DMi ¸HD DMj.
While the relation ¸HD is transitive, it is not complete. The following example illustrates
the di±culty in ranking DM's according to their rates of habit decay.
Example D.2. Suppose that the agents DM1 and DM2 satisfy our axioms and that each
DM's habit formation coe±cients are determined by three parameters:
(¸i:1;¸i:2;¸i:3;¸i:4;¸i:5;:::) = (®i;¯i;°i;°i(1 ¡ ®i);°i(1 ¡ ®i)
2;:::) for DMi; i = 1;2;
where
¯i
®i · 1¡®i and
°i
¯i · 1¡®i for each i. In particular, we specify that ®1 = ®2 = ® = 1
2,
¯1 = 1
6, ¯2 = 1
5, °1 = 1
17, and °2 = 1








for each DMi given the habits satisfy h¡h0 = (~ 0;1). Using the recursive formula,




























6 + °1 ¢ 1
® ¢ 1
2 + ¯1 ¢ 1
¼ :34

































5 + °2 ¢ 1
® ¢ 1
2 + ¯2 ¢ 1
¼ :31
Here is the di±culty: while the time-0 rate of habit decay is faster for DM1 (1
3 < 2
5), the
time-1 rate of habit decay is faster for DM2 (:31 < :34). Confounding matters, DM2's
63time-1 rate of decay is faster than DM1's time-0 rate of decay (:31 < :33), but DM1's
time-1 rate of decay is faster than DM2's time-0 rate of decay (:34 < :4).
The following proves ¸HD is complete on the set of DM's satisfying Axiom IE and
incomplete if any DM not satisfying IE is added to that set; and that under IE the notion
of habit decay in Theorem 6.1 coincides with that in De¯nition D.1.







¸k = ® for some ® 2 (0;1); (ii) for any DM1 not satisfying IE, we may
¯nd a DM2 who satis¯es IE such that ¸HD cannot rank DM1 and DM2.
Proof. To see (i), note by Theorem 6.1 that under Axiom IE there is ® 2 (0;1) such that
¸k+1








t¡1 = ® for



































which equals ®. To see part (ii), observe that Theorem 6.1 implies that DM1 does not














0 j 6= k¤ ¡ 1
1 j = k¤ ¡ 1
for all j ¸ 1. Observe that
dh¤
0 = ¸k¤¡1, dh¤0
0 = ¸k¤, dh¤
1 = ¸k¤ +¸1¸k¤¡1, and dh¤0




































¸k¤¡1 if and only if
¸k¤+1¸k¤¡1

























and take DM2 satisfying Axiom IE and for whom
^ ¸k+1
^ ¸k = ® for all k. Then DM1 and DM2
cannot be ranked by ¸HD using part (i) of the result.
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